Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence by Beecher-Monas, Erica
Masthead Logo
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-1998
Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science
in Scientific Evidence
Erica Beecher-Monas
Wayne State University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Beecher-Monas, Erica. Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence. 71 Temp. L. Rev. 55, 102 (1998)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/367
BLINDED BY SCIENCE: HOW JUDGES AVOID THE
SCIENCE IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Erica Beecher-Monas*
INTRODUCTION
Quite a hullabaloo has greeted the United States Supreme Court's 1993
evidentiary ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1 The
Supreme Court's instruction that judges must inquire into the scientific valid-
ity of proposed expert testimony2 garnered both kudos3 and criticism.4 The
consternation of Judge Kozinski, on remand, was palpable when he called the
task of evaluating scientific testimony "a far more complex and daunting task
in a post-Daubert world than before." 5 Far from backing down, however, the
Supreme Court since has reiterated its gatekeeping requirement in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner. 6
By requiring judges to evaluate the science in scientific evidence,
Daubert, and its reiteration in Joiner, makes judges responsible for the valid-
ity of the evidence in their courtrooms. Requiring judges to act as eviden-
tiary gatekeepers, analyzing proffered testimony for the soundness of its
underlying theory, its technique and application, and analyzing that testi-
mony in light of the issues posed by the case,7 does not seem like an insur-
mountable judicial task. After all, judges are supposed to direct legal
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Columbia University School of Law; J.D., University of Miami School of Law; M.S. (Anatomy),
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Columbia University School of Law. Many thanks go to Terence J. Anderson and Irwin P.
Stotzky for their mentoring and support, and to Curtis J. Berger, Martha A. Fmeman, Frank P.
Grad, and Theresa Beiner for wading through early drafts and offering their helpful comments
and criticism. Thanks also to Mack Golden for his able research assistance.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Id. at 596-97.
3. The United States Congress was so taken with the opinion that the House of Representa-
tives endorsed a bill (currently before the Senate) amending the Federal Rules of Evidence by
codifying Daubert. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also Edward W. Kirsch, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Active Judicial Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence, 50 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 213, 213 (1995) (explaining why "the Daubert standard represents a significant im-
provement over the Frye test").
4. Chief Justice Rehnquist was prominent among the judges raising an outcry about the
impossibility of the gatekeeping role assigned judges by the majority, arguing in dissent that the
majority was forcing judges "to become amateur scientists to perform [their] role." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
6. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). Notably, the majority opinion in Joiner was written by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, perhaps indicating a more optimistic assessment of the capabilities of federal
judges to perform their gatekeeping functions.
7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
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proceedings based on logical analysis and considered judgment.8 Many
judges, however, are avoiding the scientific component, particularly in crimi-
nal cases.
As the first ruling on scientific evidence by the Supreme Court since the
Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated in 1975, Daubert cannot be ig-
nored. Moreover, Daubert's requirement that judges actually think about
the validity of the evidence before them is a vast improvement over merely
deferring to the experts and hoping the jury can sort out the charlatans from
the pundits. 9 Rather than taking the Daubert mandate seriously and re-ex-
amining the basis of proferred evidence, however, many courts continue to
admit evidence that cannot be justified scientifically. 10 These courts admit
evidence that could not meet the Daubert criteria on a number of other basis:
either as "technical," and thus nonscientific, or as time-honored, and there-
fore subject to judicial notice.
The problem in criminal evidence is that hair identification, bitemark
analysis, voice spectrography, handwriting analysis, and even such time-
honored prosecutorial tools of identification as fingerprinting, have crept into
court with virtually no demonstration of their scientific bases." Each of
8. See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Mythology, and the "Acceptability of Verdicts" Thesis,
66 B.U. L. REV. 541, 561-62 (1986) (stating the judicial system "should continue to strive for
rationality" rather than depart from reality as we are able to reconstruct it).
9. For seventy years, all that was required for scientific evidence to be admissible was that it
be generally accepted in the relevant scientific field. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923). As noted infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text, the result was that judges
were able to avoid accountability for an important category of evidence being admitted in their
courts.
10. A strict Daubert analysis poses a major challenge for all but a small percentage of foren-
sic evidence in criminal cases. See, e.g., John L. Thornton, Courts of Law v. Courts of Science: A
Forensic Scientist's Reaction to Daubert, 1 SHEPARD's EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 475, 482
(1994) (noting that much of forensic science has "precious little scientific foundation" and "does
not comport with the classical definition of a science"). Daubert was a civil toxic tort action; the
current approach of the courts, however, is to apply Daubert in both the civil and the criminal
contexts. Developments in the Law, Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1529 (1995) [hereinafter Confronting the New Challenges]. Apart from
DNA identification techniques, which originated for other than forensic uses and therefore were
subjected to rigorous scientific scrutiny as they developed, the problem for forensic evidence is
its questionable scientific foundation. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for
Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 133-34 (1991) (observing that most forensic science is not
endorsed by general scientific community, its procedures have undergone little controlled test-
ing, and its error rates are either undetermined or preposterously high); Michael J. Saks &
Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic
Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 362 (1991) (noting that "more is known about the strengths
and weaknesses of DNA fingerprinting evidence than about most of the other, older, and more
widely used forms of forensic science evidence"); Thornton, supra, at 482 (noting that "[a]
number of tests-e.g., handwriting comparison, hair identification- have marked empirical va-
lidity but precious little scientific foundation because they are so subjective and, furthermore, do
not comport with the classical definition of a science").
11. See Suggs v. State, 907 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Ark. 1995) (finding hair sample admissible
although expert admitted on cross-examination that "the scientific field cannot prove the hair
came from a certain individual to the exclusion of any other person"); Margaret A. Berger,
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these identification techniques is based on the theory that fingerprints, voice
patterns, bitemarks, etc., are uniquely personal. 12 This is a theory based on
faith (and-in the case of fingerprints, at least-some experience 13), not on
the rigorous testing expected of scientific disciplines or required to meet the
Daubert standards of admissibility. 14
The thesis of this article is that requiring judges to examine the logic
behind scientific evidence presents the opportunity for causing major, benefi-
cial changes in the evidence offered in criminal cases. Evaluating the basis of
scientific evidence is not an insurmountable task. Those jurisdictions taking
Daubert seriously and re-examining forensic evidence have disallowed, as un-
able to meet the threshold of scientific validity, such time-honored identifica-
tion techniques as hair and voiceprints. Some techniques, such as
polygraphs, that long have been denied admissibility as unreliable, are begin-
Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1354-55 (1994)
(observing that some of most venerable branches of forensic evidence have never demonstrated
their ability to make unique identifications).
12. See, e.g., Michelle McClure, Comment, Odontology: Bite Marks as Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 270 (1995) (discussing debate over
whether each individual possesses a unique dentition and bite mark).
13. Note, however, that although it is popular belief that no two fingerprints are alike, there
have been no systematic controlled studies to prove it. Moreover, fingerprint identification tech-
niques are far from infallible. See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 587 (Minn. 1982)
(mandating new trial because fingerprint expert's testimony later was discovered to be wrong);
Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 12 (1993) (stating that "[m]isidentifications have even occurred in
disciplines as old and widely used as fingerprint identification"); George Bonebreak, Fabricating
Fingerprint Evidence, IDENTIFICATION NEWS, Oct. 1976, at 3 (describing fifteen cases of
fabricated fingerprint evidence).
14. Indeed, where courts have addressed the admissibility of such forensic evidence under
the Daubert standard, they have had to admit it could not pass the admissibility threshold and
have had to find other avenues to find it admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880
F. Supp. 1027, 1046-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that although handwriting analysis could not
meet Daubert standards, it was nonetheless admissible as nonscience that would be helpful to
jury). Notably, many forensic techniques have made their way into the courtroom under the
general acceptance test, only to be discarded subsequently. See Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary
Framework, in THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER'S REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE 75 (1995) (noting that general acceptance by a small number of experts in a given field
allowed in the now-discredited techniques of voiceprint analysis and paraffin testing for gunpow-
der residue, among others). As one commentator explained,
[M]ost of the forensic identification sciences cannot begin to meet the new Daubert
criterion by which they will be tested, although they easily passed the old Frye stan-
dard. Identification science consists largely of speculation, impression, and intuition. It
is a field of assertedly scientific endeavor that, ironically, cannot offer sufficient re-
search data in its own behalf simply because its basic theoretical notions have been
subjected to virtually no empirical testing.
Michael J. Saks, Implications of the Daubert Test for Forensic Identification Science, 1 SHEP-
ARD'S EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 427 (1994). This factor has been widely recognized in other
common law countries, such as Great Britain, Australia, and Canada, and is engendering a wide-
spread debate over the perceived misuse of scientific evidence in criminal cases. See David E.
Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 123, 174
(1996) (discussing criticism resulting from misuse of "junk science").
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ning to find their way into court via Daubert. 15 Admission of psychological
testimony for the defense is also more frequent than in the past. 16 Other
methodologies, such as DNA testing, that were formerly the exclusive prov-
ince of the prosecution, are now being introduced to demonstrate innocence,
meeting the Daubert criteria, and resulting in the release and acquittal of
wrongly accused or convicted defendants.17 Outside the courtroom, the re-
cent investigation and critique of the FBI's forensic laboratories is an exam-
ple of beneficial changes feasible when Daubert is taken seriously.18
Daubert requires litigants and judges to focus on the interaction of the-
ory and methodology in a way that should change not only the way evidence
must be justified, but the soundness of the evidence itself.19 All too often,
however, courts continue to evade the science issues. In far too many juris-
dictions, judges are turning a blind eye to the science involved in the evi-
dence before them. Ignoring Daubert is a travesty in criminal trials where
the presumption of innocence is fundamental.
I. DA UBERT AND ITS GENESIS
A. Admissibility of Expert Testimony Pre-Daubert
Daubert emerged against the backdrop of immense public controversy
over the perceived flood of "junk science" that, according to some popular
critics, threatened to inundate the courts.20 For years, Frye v. United States2 1
15. See, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding polygraph
evidence is no longer per se inadmissible after Daubert); Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
897 F. Supp. 299, 303 (W.D. La. 1995) (finding polygraph tests of insureds admissible in jury trial
on insurance claims); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding
polygraph evidence sufficiently reliable under Daubert to permit defendant to offer it as evi-
dence at trial). But see United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding
Daubert did not alter settled rule that polygraph evidence was inadmissible).
16. See United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1996) (remanding for reconsid-
eration of whether psychiatric and social psychology testimony could qualify under Daubert);
United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding it was erroneous to exclude
psychiatric testimony); United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. 1132, 1134-35 (D.N.J. 1996) (stat-
ing that testimony regarding reliability of eyewitness identification admissible).
17. A recently released report examines the exoneration and release of twenty-eight
wrongly convicted defendants-some of whom had been sentenced to death-through DNA
evidence. EDWARD CONNERS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE (1996).
18. Although the immediate cause of the Department of Justice investigation of the FBI
laboratories was the whistleblowing of Frederic Whitehurst, the thoroughness of the investiga-
tion and the resulting recommended overhaul of the laboratories was, in large part, a response to
what the Department perceived as the mandate of Daubert to justify the scientific validity of
forensic evidence. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, FBI LABS REPORT 9 (May 30, 1997) [hereinafter FBI LABS REPORT] (acknowledging
significant impact of Daubert on the way forensic evidence must be analyzed and presented).
19. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging significant impact of Daubert on the way forensic evidence
must be analyzed and presented).
20. The term "junk science" was popularized by Peter Huber, who defined it as "jargon-
filled, serious-sounding deception." PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM 2, 3 (1991). Toxic tort cases, involving allegations of injury resulting from
[Vol. 71
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was the predominant standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence.22
Frye was a murder case involving expert testimony based on an early version
of the polygraph technique, which the court found inadmissible because poly-
graph testing had not achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.2 3 The Frye test asked whether the proffered evidence-includ-
ing the conclusions reached-was generally accepted in a relevant commu-
nity of experts. 24 Frye thus offered a standard of admissibility based on the
general acceptance of the proposed testimony by a relevant community of
experts, and permitted peer review and publication to substitute for any at-
tempt at analysis by the court.
Although a majority of courts applied the general acceptance standard,
its results were anything but uniform. Some courts applying the general ac-
ceptance test did little more than "count noses, '25 while others performed in-
exposure to chemicals, were the primary focus of Mr. Huber's ire. An often-cited example is
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), in which the court permitted
testimony that spermicide caused birth defects and based its decision on the credibility of the
expert rather than the scientific validity of the testimony. Id. at 744-45. For an article detailing
the momentum for reform of the admissibility requirements for scientific evidence, see Paul C.
Giannelli, "Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 107-08
(1993).
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. A majority of courts at the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert-
including the district court in Daubert-followed the general acceptance test first articulated in
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye Court explained that "while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific prin-
ciple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. Even
after promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the general acceptance test continued to be
the majority standard. A notable exception was the Second Circuit, which rejected Frye in
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-99 (2d Cir. 1978) (assessing reliability by examin-
ing acceptance among scientists who had used the technique, relevant error rate, protocol stan-
dards, and the expert's application of the technique), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
Arkansas rejected the Frye standard in 1991, favoring a more analytic approach. See Prater v.
State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ark. 1991) (requiring proponent of evidence to make preliminary
showing of reliability and opponent to attack reliability on cross-examination at preliminary
hearing). California adopted a variation of the Frye test, which required the additional demon-
stration that the correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case. See People v.
Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976). In 1989, New York adopted a similar requirement. See
People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (1989). Some courts, including the Eighth Circuit, sub-
sequently focused on the reliability of the evidence, and required the court to hear testimony
from experts on both sides regarding the matter. See United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61
(8th Cir. 1990); Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 248 (Ala. 1991); People v. Lindsey, 868 P.2d 1085,
1090-91 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992). Others courts rejected this requirement. See State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 505 n.2
(Wash. 1993) (stating Frye test is more conservative approach because court is less likely to
admit evidence still disputed in scientific community).
23. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
24. Id.
25. See Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 (admitting spectrographic voice analysis testimony de-
spite its lack of general acceptance because it found scientific validity cannot rest solely on a
process of counting scientific noses); see also United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir.
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depth analyses. 26 In practice, the apparently straightforward standard pro-
voked a number of controversies.
For one, it frequently was unclear which facets of the testimony or un-
derlying rationale must be generally accepted. 27 For another, the Frye stan-
dard failed to account for the phenomenon that much knowledge slips into
general acceptance without any careful examination, especially where that
knowledge has been accepted for a long time. 28 Most controversial of all,
however, was the Frye test's substitution of peer review and publication for
any detailed analysis by the court. In effect, this permitted nonjudicial actors
to make what is essentially a judicial policy decision and deflected responsi-
bility away from the judge.29
Consequently, at a time when scientific evidence was becoming increas-
ingly important in resolving legal disputes, the standards for its courtroom
use were anything but certain. 30 Not surprisingly, criticism of the legal sys-
tem's ability to cope with scientific evidence mounted.31 Among the various
solutions proposed were separate science courts, 32 special administrative
1985) (excluding testimony as to footprint identification because general acceptance was neither
a necessary nor sufficient condition for admissibility); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1209-11 (1980) (discussing difficulties in applying Frye test); Barry C. Scheck, DNA and
Daubert, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1959, 1959 (1994) (discussing fact that under Frye test judges
merely "count noses").
26. The opinion in In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), provides an excellent example of in-depth analysis under the Frye test. Cf
Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 10, at 1494-95 (noting the demonstrable doctrinal
indeterminacy illustrated by the fact that "Frye courts have come out both ways" on the same
type of evidence).
27. Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye
Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 553 (1984) (giving examples).
28. David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Ex-
ploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1811 & n.37 (1994) (citing Philip H. Abelson, The Need for Skepti-
cism, 138 Sci. 75 (1962)).
29. David L. Faigman, Making the Law Safe for Science: A Proposed Rule for the Admissi-
bility of Expert Testimony, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 401,405 (1996) (observing that "greatest defect of
the general acceptance test was that it allowed judges to abdicate responsibility for understand-
ing science well enough to integrate it into the law").
30. Jennifer Laser, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. To Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 Lov. L.A. L. REv.
1379, 1379 (1997) (observing that with an increasing reliance on expert testimony, the standards
for admissibility became a matter of great debate).
31. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 20, at 216-28 (arguing that judges should scrutinize sub-
stance of scientific testimony before admitting it). Huber's expose itself came under attack as a
form of junk science because it was based on anecdotal rather than survey evidence. See Ken-
neth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1652
(1993) (rejecting Huber's work as factually incorrect and product of faulty legal analysis).
32. See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 Sci.
763, 764 (proposing science court to solve problem of judicial inability to handle scientific
testimony).
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tribunals,33 and an interdisciplinary council established to advise the courts. 34
It was against this background that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Daubert.
B. The Daubert Analysis
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.35 was a civil case involving
claims that Bendectin, a morning-sickness remedy which the plaintiffs'
mothers had taken during pregnancy, had caused plaintiffs' limb-reduction
birth defects. 36 The evidence at issue consisted of epidemiological re-
analyses, in which data obtained in previously published studies was re-
analyzed and proffered to support plaintiffs' claims. The trial court found the
plaintiffs' proffer insufficient to withstand defendants' motion for summary
judgment, because it did not meet with general acceptance in the field to
which it belongs.37 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding an expert opinion
inadmissible absent general acceptance of the underlying technique, 3 8 and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve "the proper standard for the
admission of expert testimony."'3 9
The Supreme Court dispatched the general acceptance test in a few
paragraphs, finding it an "austere standard" that was superseded by adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. 40 The Court explained that the
two-pronged test of Rule 70241 requires judges to assume a gatekeeping role
by inquiring into the reliability of the evidence and the helpfulness of the
33. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific
Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 523-32 (1988) (propos-
ing administrative mechanism for handling toxic tort litigation).
34. See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & GOVERNMENT, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING
CHALLENGES 49 (1993) (proposing interdisciplinary science council to advise the courts).
35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
36. Id. at 582-83.
37. Id. at 583.
38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
39. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
40. Id. at 589. Calling the Frye general acceptance test an austere standard is somewhat
surprising, considering the widespread criticism of the courts for permitting far too much "junk
science" to come into evidence, as exemplified by HUBER, supra note 20. It is also something of
an anomaly that the rigorous analysis mandated by the Court would be far more austere in effect
than the general acceptance standard, which let in anything that could command a consensus
among a group of specialists. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, use of
the term "austere" gives credence to the notion that the Supreme Court was widening rather
than closing the gate to scientific evidence. On the other hand, as Judge Kozinski was quick to
note on remand, the rigorous analysis required by the Supreme Court would close the gate to
much of the expert testimony in criminal cases. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1317 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). This fear was picked up by Congress in its proposed bill, H.R.
988, which would have codified Daubert as a rule of evidence, but which exempted criminal
evidence from its scope. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
41. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
1998]
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evidence to the jury.42 This requires the trial judge to conduct an independ-
ent inquiry into the scientific validity, scientific reliability, and relevance of
the proposed testimony.43
The Court defined reliability in the scientific context as scientific valid-
ity, which the majority linked to the expert's adherence to scientific
method.44 To determine scientific validity, the trial judge must examine both
the logic underlying the expert's methodology and the application of the
methodology in the particular case.45 The Court distinguished evidentiary
reliability, which in the context of scientific evidence it defined as scientific
"validity," from scientific "reliability" (the ability to produce consistent re-
sults by means of the scientific method). 46 That is, the Court recognized that
a flawed test based on a faulty hypothesis may produce consistent, replicable
results (and therefore be scientifically reliable) without being either scientifi-
cally valid or reliable as evidence. 47
The first prong of the Court's analysis thus requires judges to critique
scientific evidence and separate the wheat of valid scientific methodology
from the chaff of chicanery.48 In satisfying the reliability portion of the test,
the proponent must establish, by a preponderance of the proof,49 that "the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and.., that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue."'50 The second prong is a relevance inquiry, that asks whether there is
a "valid scientific connection [of the underlying principles and methodology]
to the pertinent inquiry. '51
According to the Supreme Court, the judge must be able to examine the
logic behind the expert's proffered testimony without taking sides on its out-
come.52 Not the expert's conclusions, but the principles and methodology
underlying the proposed testimony are to be the object of judicial scrutiny.53
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-92.
43. Id. at 597.
44. Id. at 590.
45. Id. at 580.
46. Id. at 590 n.9.
47. A cogent example is given in Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 10, at 1534: "a
new test for blood alcohol level may be invalid in that it grossly underestimates the amount of
alcohol in one's bloodstream, and yet may be reliable in that it underestimates the blood alcohol
level in one's bloodstream by the same amount every time."
48. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
49. Id. at 592 & n.10.
50. Id. at 592-93.
51. Id. at 592. This second requirement, which the Court referred to as "fit", was the sub-
ject of further elaboration in Joiner, where the Court addressed the admissibility of epidemiolog-
ical and animal studies, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
studies too far afield to be relevant to the facts at issue. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct.
512, 515 (1997).
52. Id. at 594.
53. Id.
[Vol. 71
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To guide this scrutiny, the Court outlined four non-definitive factors. The
trial judge should consider whether the theory can be and has been tested, its
error rate, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, and
whether it has met with general acceptance in the scientific community.
54
II. ISSUES UNRESOLVED BY DAUBERT
Among the issues left unresolved by the Daubert decision are the kinds
of evidence that fall within the scope of the Court's mandated analysis,
whether judges are capable of the gatekeeping task now imposed upon them,
and whether Daubert has resulted in more or less consistent evidentiary rul-
ings among the circuits. Other questions include whether more or less evi-
dence will find its way into court as a result of Daubert, at what point in the
proceedings a Daubert challenge may be made, and whether the state courts
will elect to follow the Daubert analysis. The answers to these questions are
still far from clear.
A. To What Kinds of Evidence Does Daubert Apply? The Technical vs.
Scientific Debate
District judges have no discretion to ignore Daubert.55 Where Daubert
applies, its framework for analysis must be used.5 6 The question, of course, is
just what kinds of evidence fall within Daubert's scope. The evidence at issue
in Daubert was novel scientific testimony involving reanalyses of previously
gathered epidemiologic data, offered in a toxic tort case. Unquestionably,
therefore, Daubert applies to novel scientific evidence in federal civil cases.
57
But, due to the Supreme Court's equivocation about whether the Daubert
analysis is limited to that context, 58 many questions remain. Must courts en-
gage in a Daubert analysis for expert evidence that is not scientific, i.e., for
evidence that is "merely technical"? Does it apply to scientific evidence that
is not novel? Must a court apply Daubert in criminal cases? 59 Many courts
54. Id. General acceptance was the standard articulated under Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific principles forming basis of expert testimony
must be generally accepted in particular field).
55. Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1993) (deciding that
Daubert demands determination of reliability of cash flow analysis).
56. Id.
57. Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 10, at 1498-1509.
58. The Court said only that "[allthough the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on
,novel' scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or
exclusively to unconventional evidence." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11. This appears to suggest
a broader application for Daubert analysis than novel scientific evidence. On the other hand, the
Court further muddied the waters by suggesting that well established scientific theories, such as
the laws of thermodynamics, are subject to judicial notice. Id.
59. Because the Frye standard, which the Court overruled, originated in a criminal case
involving the admissibility of polygraph evidence, and by implication from the numerous crimi-
nal cases cited in Daubert, it would appear that the Court made no distinction in terms of the
evidentiary analyses required in civil and criminal cases involving scientific evidence. It did not,
however, directly address the issue.
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consider these questions to have been left unanswered by the Supreme
Court's decision and use this as an opportunity to circumvent the required
analysis.60
Post-Daubert criminal courts have attempted to answer these questions
in a number of ways. A few have used the guidelines to analyze proffered
criminal evidence and have found previously acceptable evidence inadmissi-
ble.61 More often, rather than engage in a full Daubert analysis, courts con-
fronted with the admissibility of criminal identification evidence resort to
categorizing the evidence as "technical" and therefore outside the scope of
Daubert.62  Such tactics are an unwarranted abdication of judicial
responsibility.63
First, Rule 702, which the Supreme Court construed in Daubert, applies
to the admissibility of all expert testimony. 64 Although the Court said its
discussion was limited to scientific knowledge, because that was what was
before the Court, the Court required that the proposed testimony be sup-
ported by "good grounds. '65 That means it must be supported by valid
60. The Court cryptically noted that although Rule 702 applies to technical or other special-
ized, as well as scientific, knowledge, its discussion was limited to the scientific context by virtue
of the nature of the proffered expertise. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
61. Hair analysis, previously widely admissible, see infra notes 317-20 and accompanying
text, failed to meet the Daubert standards in Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1559
(E.D. Okla. 1995) (finding hair comparison testing unreliable due to lack of scientific studies).
62. See United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1997) (deciding that Daubert
applies only to scientific, not technical or specialized, knowledge). This is not the only circum-
venting gambit. Others include judicial notice, or finding the evidence so overwhelmingly preju-
dicial when balanced against its probative value that-assuming it could pass muster under Rule
702-it is found inadmissible under Rule 403 (without the necessity of engaging in a full Daubert
analysis). See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (excluding polygraph
evidence because probative value of evidence substantially outweighed by confusion of issues
and misleading jury); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
polygraph results properly excluded due to unfair prejudice substantially outweighing probative
value), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996). Or courts punt the issue to the jury, finding disagree-
ments over performance of valid protocol to go to the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility. See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 561 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that applica-
tion goes to weight, not admissibility). But see United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th
Cir. 1993) (finding failure to follow standard protocol goes to admissibility); United States v.
Coronado-Cervantes, 912 F. Supp. 497, 500 (D.N.M. 1996) (holding that compliance with DNA
procedure goes to admissibility, not weight).
63. For an article castigating courts for this "crabbed interpretation of the Court's opinion
as well as a misconstruction of the principles underlying Rule 702" see David L. Faigman, Map-
ping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 559 (1995) (discussing ramifica-
tions of Daubert on judge's responsibilities and on Federal Rules of Evidence).
64. For the text of Rule 702, see supra note 41.
65. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
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methods and reasoning.66 The most important mandate of Daubert is that
judges must actively evaluate proposed expert testimony.67
Knowledge, according to the Court, "connotes more than subjective be-
lief or unsupported speculation. '68 It makes little sense to admit any expert
evidence grounded in faulty logic and untested methodology. Biases, idi-
osyncracies, faulty logic, and all the other modes of self-deception have no
more place in evidence used to determine an accused's guilt or innocence
than they do in evidence used to determine the liability of pharmaceutical
companies for the birth defects of babies whose mothers ingested their prod-
ucts. What makes "good grounds" for technical, as well as scientific, evi-
dence is keen observation and critical evaluation of what was observed. 69
There is no a priori rationale for encouraging self-deception in one category
of evidence (the "technical") while castigating it in another (the "scien-
tific"). 70 Postulations about causation and the necessary interconnection be-
tween repeatable phenomena must be as carefully tested in criminal
laboratories as in medical research, if not more so. 71
Moreover, the Court must have expected judges to analyze the rationale
behind technical-i.e., criminal-evidence as well as "novel" scientific meth-
odologies, such as the epidemiology reanalyses at issue in Daubert. Frye,
which the Court overruled, involved polygraph evidence.72 That is precisely
the kind of evidence many courts now are attempting to categorize as "tech-
nical" and therefore notsubject to Daubert. This is highly disingenuous. The
Court even referred to the evidence at issue in Frye as "scientific. '73 To ex-
empt purportedly accurate identification techniques from scrutiny in cases
which are supposed to bear an increased burden of proof because they in-
66. See Susan R. Poulter, Daubert and Scientific Evidence: Assessing Evidentiary Reliability
in Toxic Tort Litigation, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1307, 1321 (1993) (stating that because invalid rea-
soning or methods cannot produce probative conclusions, evidence derived from such methods is
not relevant).
67. Cf. Faigman, supra note 63, at 555 (stating that single most important "guidepost" in
Daubert is Court's directive to judges to "actively evaluate" scientific evidence).
68. Id.
69. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Assessment of Expertise: Transcending Construction, 37
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 301, 320-22 (1997) (explaining that although observing nature is not
value-free, process of rigorous, critical evaluation attempts to minimize self-deception).
70. The methodology of good science is a set of rules to keep the practitioner from self-
deception about the observations made about the study of natural phenomena. Theodore R.
Vallance, Social Science and Social Policy: Amoral Methodology in a Matrix of Values, 27 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 107 (Feb. 1972).
71. Cf. Jonakait, supra note 69, at 320-21 & 323 n.66 (explaining that postulations about
causation and necessary interconnection between repeatable phenomena demand gathering of
facts: observations from nature or from deliberate perturbations of nature, called experiments).
72. Frye actually involved the precursor of the modern polygraph, the "systolic blood-pres-
sure deception test." Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
73. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993).
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volve the defendant's potential deprivation of liberty, and perhaps death, de-
fies justice as well as logic.74
Regrettably, in a large number of jurisdictions, post-Daubert courts are
circumventing any rigorous analysis in order to continue to admit expert tes-
timony that is shockingly unscientific. 75 Not infrequently, convictions have
been based on evidence for which the scientific foundation is highly sus-
pect.76 Continued admissibility in some jurisdictions of bitemark analysis,
voiceprint evidence, and handwriting analysis can be accounted for only in
this way, because there is virtually no empirical data on error rates for this
kind of evidence, and what there is suggests that the so-called experts are
wrong as often as they are right. 77 Admitting such evidence under the guise
that it is "technical nonscience" is dishonest in the extreme. The term "tech-
nical nonscience" is technical nonsense. It is precisely the kind of technical
evidence masquerading as science that Daubert was concerned most about.
It should be obvious by the Court's emphasis on gatekeeping that judges
must admit only expert testimony that can withstand logical analysis. 78 It is
the judge's job to distinguish between useful and misleading testimony.79
Although the details of the inquiry may differ depending on the type of evi-
dence proffered (indeed, as the Court explained, its factors are merely guide-
lines), all expert testimony is subject to Rule 702. Failure to examine the
74. See Faigman, supra note 29, at 422 (observing that "pseudoscientists could draw the
perverse conclusion from Daubert that the key to admission is to remain unscientific in order to
avoid standards they find difficult to meet").
75. See generally David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of the Social Sciences Under
Daubert: Is it "Scientific," "Technical," or "Other" Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
960 (1995) (discussing Daubert's applicability to realm of psychology).
76. Forensic dentists identifying scratch marks and forensic anthropologists claiming to
identify the wearer from shoe prints are egregious examples of untested pseudo-science respon-
sible for convictions. See Marcia Coyle, Daubert vs. Frye: "Expert" Science Under Fire in Capi-
tal Cases, NAT'L L.J., July 11, 1994, at Al (discussing use of forensic dentist); Mark Hansen,
Believe it or Not, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 64-67 (discussing forensic anthropologist identification
of person from shoe print). A more celebrated example of such evidentiary travesties can be
found in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), where the defendant was executed based on
evidence of future dangerousness, evidence most responsible psychologists find to be "at the
brink of quackery." Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2021 (1994) (quoting George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerous-
ness," Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 Am. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977)).
77. D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 744-51 (1989)
(detailing unpublished results of tests given by Forensic Science Foundation over several years,
for which most generous reading of results showed accuracy rate of only 57%).
78. As one court explained, although the details of Daubert apply to scientific knowledge
because that was the context of the case, its general requirements apply to all specialized knowl-
edge. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995).
79. See Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert's Debut: The Supreme Court, The Economics of Scientific
Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 49 (1995) (observing that
"Daubert reorients admissibility doctrine more closely to what one might reasonably expect of
evidence law" by requiring "an acceptable analog in expert testimony to the foundation require-
ment of first-hand knowledge in ordinary testimony ... [in order] to insure that the witness has
an observational advantage over the fact-finders").
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logical underpinnings-and in particular, the error rates-for forensic identi-
fication techniques, would appear to undermine the presumption of inno-
cence to which our criminal courts give lip service.
Why is this happening in the criminal courts? As noted earlier, the di-
lemma for the criminal courts is that much criminal identification evidence in
its current state of development cannot possibly meet the Daubert stan-
dards.8 0 Often there is little empirical support for the evidence. Appropriate
scientific standards are widely ignored in forensic laboratories. 81 The recent
exposure of perjury and pervasively bad laboratory practices in the FBI labo-
ratories has forced a number of retrials and overturned convictions. 82 Such
problems emphasize the urgency of analyzing all expert testimony with the
same kind of rigor required for scientific evidence under Daubert. Rather
than meet these problems head-on, however, and risk the wrath of prosecu-
tors (and the public) unable to get key evidence admitted, courts are using
circumventing gambits to avoid analysis that would reveal the systemic inade-
quacies of criminal laboratories.
B. Can Federal Judges Perform the Required Analysis?
Although the "junk science" outcry is frequently ascribed to the insur-
ance lobby incensed over increasing civil liability awards,83 the most dramatic
changes from a rigorous analysis may be in the criminal context. If the prob-
lem was the inability of courts to deal with scientific evidence intelligently
because judges simply had no frame of reference with which to evaluate the
validity of scientific knowledge, Daubert gave courts some flexible guide-
lines.8 4 In addition, the Court declared its unreserved confidence in the abil-
ity of trial judges to make such determinations with respect to scientific
evidence. Unfortunately, both the usefulness of the guidelines and the ability
of judges to apply them have generated controversy. 85
80. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 10, at 361-62 (providing that extensive scrutiny given
DNA evidence reveals lack of empirical support for most forensic evidence and noting that
widely asserted assumptions that no two fingerprints, gun barrel markings, writings, or tool
marks is the same, lacks empirical support).
81. The National Research Council ("NRC") issued a report recommending stricter stan-
dards for certifying and testing forensic laboratories. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TYPING IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (Apr. 14, 1992).
82. See generally FBI LABS REPORT, supra note 18 (Apr. 15, 1997) (supplying findings of
investigation of FBI laboratory).
83. See Chesebro, supra note 31, at 1643 (noting wide support of Huber's view on "junk
science" particularly by insurance lobby).
84. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (providing that
testability, peer review and publication, rate of error, and general acceptance are factors trial
judges may consider in assessing reliability of method).
85. See, e.g., John M. Conley & David W. Peterson, The Science of Gatekeeping: The Fed-
eral Judicial Center's New Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1183, 1205
(1996) (noting experience of authors that federal judges "tend to be highly resistant to the sort of
learning that Daubert demands").
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1. Do the Guidelines Make Sense?
The most important and controversial of the Court's guidelines were its
testability and error rate factors. The remaining factors, peer review and
publication, and general acceptance, are merely reiterations of the old Frye
test and have been accepted with virtually no discussion. Many judges are
resistant to the sort of analysis that Daubert demands.86 In his Daubert dis-
sent, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that he was at a loss to
know what falsifiability, the Court's explanation of testability, meant.87 The
Center for Judicial Studies has made extensive efforts to educate judges
about the scientific method.88 Whether the guidelines offer adequate gui-
dance to trial judges is therefore an important question.
Specifically, the Court directed judges to examine testability, whether
the hypothesis can be and has been tested. This inquiry should encompass
the adequacy of the testing method in terms of its ability to show what it is
supposed to demonstrate. 89 In doing so, the Court recognized that the con-
cept of genuine testability is a unique form of scientific argument.90 Genuine
testability in science means not only that a hypothesis can be verified or falsi-
fied by observation and experiment, but also that the hypothesis has precise
logical consequences that are incompatible with alternative hypotheses. 9 1
Testability thus means that the effects of secondary variables are either
controlled or known (as in an experiment) or assumed (as in observational
86. Id. at 1205-06 ("Our nearly uniform experience with hundreds of judges at every level is
that they think methodology is something for academics to worry about.").
87. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
88. See THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1
(1997) (providing basic information about fundamental scientific protocols in order to assist
judges in performing required analysis).
89. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
90. "The goal of science is the systematic organization of knowledge about the universe on
the basis of explanatory principles that are genuinely testable." Francisco J. Ayala, Biology as an
Autonomous Science, 56 AM. Sci. 207, 207 (1968). According to Karl Popper, the distinguishing
characteristic of a scientific statement is that it is capable of being falsified. KARL R. POPPER,
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 86 (1959). Although few scientists would describe their
work in terms of falsifiability of particular statements (most would call their work verifying hy-
potheses), it may be said that was what they were doing after the fact. See Tests of the Truth,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1992, at 106 ("Few experimenters plan their work in terms of falsification
of particular statements-though it is possible, after the fact, to say that that is what they have
been doing. Experiments are often taken as confirmations of truth, not failures to falsify.").
Falsifiability is the term defining scientific method that was picked up by the Supreme Court in
explaining the concept of testability, much to the chagrin of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who, in the
Daubert dissent, remarked that he was "at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the
scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability."' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
91. Ayala, supra note 90, at 207. "Science advances toward truth (though never arriving at
certainty) by a combination of bold conjecture and severe criticism." Thomas F. Gieryn, Bound-
aries of Science, in HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 395 (Sheila Jasanoff et
al. eds., 1994).
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studies of human populations, for example). 92 In creating a control group, a
researcher is permitting the chosen hypothesis to be falsified. The data may
either corroborate or refute the proposed hypothesis. 93
The validity of the experimental conclusion depends on: (1) whether the
results demonstrate a relationship between the tested variables; (2) whether
there is a causal or merely fortuitous relationship; (3) whether the hypothe-
sized cause and effect relationship is logical in light of the experimental re-
sults; and (4) whether the relationship between the variables can be
generalized to other situations. 94 Problems in any of these areas would un-
dermine the study's validity. This involves sufficient inquiry into the details
of a given set of experiments to determine whether the hypothesis being
tested logically could be validated or falsified by the experiments in question,
whether the researcher's design avoided potential sources of bias, and
whether the experiments were conducted carefully and with appropriate con-
trols so that the data accurately reflects the results of the experiment. 95
The notion of testability as the sine qua non of scientific argument con-
cededly has come under fire in recent years. That is because major theoreti-
cal constructs may be corroborated by observation but are not empirically
testable. Evolution, for example, although widely accepted in scientific cir-
cles, is not testable. 96 Neither is the theory of relativity.97
Moreover, the concept of testability as the defining characteristic of sci-
ence creates a dilemma for the social sciences and psychology. These fields
rely predominantly on retrospective observational studies rather than on con-
trolled experimentation, and do not necessarily meet the Daubert standard of
falsifiability.98 Although it can be said that these fields have evolved outside
92. For a descriptive distinction between experiment, quasi-experiment, and observational
study, see Stephen E. Fienberg et al., Understanding and Evaluating Statistical Evidence in Liti-
gation, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 15-17 (1995).
93. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to
the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1018 (1995) (stating "the fact that scientific
theories are vulnerable to falsification imparts a strength stemming from having taken the risk of
refutation").
94. THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN &
ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETrINGS 39 (1979).
95. Id. at 7-8 (discussing various meanings of "control" in research).
96. See, e.g., Conley & Peterson, supra note 85, at 1201-04 (noting fallacies in Supreme
Court's reliance on testability as ultimate criteria for what makes something "scientific").
97. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case? The Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (1995). See, e.g., STEPHEN
W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 74-75 (1988)
(acknowledging shortcomings of experimental testing of grand unified theories of the universe).
This may be because of the lag time between the theory's promulgation and the development of
technology capable of testing it. For example, not until 1995 was the technology available to
demonstrate the physical consequences of Einstein's "unified field theory." See Adina Schwartz,
A "Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and the
Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149,
187-88 (1997) (discussing evolution of technology to test Einstein's unified field theory).
98. Indeed, Karl Popper, whom the Supreme Court cited for its concept of falsifiability, was
using the concept explicitly to differentiate between "true" empirical science and what Popper
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the scientific method, that does not make their insights any less valuable. It
may be that a parallel set of criteria for validity must be developed for these
non-empirical sciences. However, apart from testability, many of the same
concerns with respect to validity, such as the use of statistics and the coher-
ence of the underlying theory, are indicia of reliability in these fields also.
Observation and interpretation, and the fit between them, are concerns
basic to scientific reasoning. 99 Replicability of results is only one factor in
determining scientific validity. It is also crucial to determine how well (i.e.,
how logically) the data is analyzed.100 This is why it is important to examine
the methodology for formal problems of experimental design, 10 1 models of
data,10 2 and how well the data actually fit the model of the data expected
from the theory.10 3 The theory of the experiment permeates all these consid-
erations. 10 4 Difficulties encountered at all but the level of "fit" to expected
models reflect weaknesses in the experiment rather than in the fundamental
theory.10 5
considered the pseudosciences of economics (Karl Marx was the particular target of Popper's
ire) and psychology (Freud was singled out in Popper's polemic). Schwartz, supra note 97, at
162, 165.
99. KARIN D. KNORR-CETNA, THE MANUFACTURE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON THE
CONSTRUCrIVIST AND CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SCIENCE 21 (1981).
100. Validity refers to the ability of a scientific test to measure what it purports to measure.
Id.
101. The issues with respect to the model involve the number of trials and choice of experi-
mental parameters. Id. A model is the formal description of "how observations are produced"
incorporating various assumptions "implicit in the presentation" of the evidence. Fienberg et al.,
supra note 92, at 2.
102. Issues involving models of data include homogeneity, stationarity, fit of experimental
parameters. Patrick Suppes, Models of Data, in LOGIC, METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1960 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 252, 256-59 (Ernest Nagel et
al. eds., 1962).
103. See id. at 258-59 (discussing hierarchy of "theories, models, and problems").
104. Id. at 259.
105. Id. For example, a scientist assessing the validity of conclusions in a contested body of
scientific work-epidemiology-describes five problem areas as: (i) a "stipulated research hy-
pothesis;" (ii) a "well-specified cohort;" (iii) "high-quality data;" (iv) "analysis of attributable
actions;" and (v) "avoidance of detection bias." Alvan R. Feinstein, Scientific Standards in Epi-
demiologic Studies of the Menace of Daily Life, 242 Sci. 1257, 1259-61 (1988). Cohort studies are
observational studies in which one group is composed of individuals already exposed to a sus-
pected disease-causing agent a control group composed of similar individuals who have not been
exposed to the agent. Case control studies are limited to the study of a single disease, proceed
by using existence of the disease as the independent variable, and utilize controls who are similar
individuals who did not develop the disease. Both methodologies are subject to systematic er-
rors. How the group is selected or diagnosed can be crucial. See, e.g., David L. Sackett, Bias in
Analytic Research, 32 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 51, 51 (1979) (describing numerous sources of sys-
temic bias). Inaccurate diagnosis of the disease is one problem area in epidemiology, as is mea-
surement of exposure. Random selection is another potential source of error. Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of the Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: the Leg-
acy of "Agent Orange" and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 650 (1992).
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Several statistical 0 6 concepts are also important in assessing the validity
of scientific conclusions. Mean, 10 7 standard deviation, a0 8 level of statistical
significance, 10 9 and confidence interval 10 are basic concepts surfacing in lit-
erally thousands of cases."' These concerns about statistics are part of what
underlies the Court's error rate factor. In addition, the error rate factor en-
compasses the application of the methodology in the particular case. It is
important to know, especially in criminal identification tests, how often a
given test gives the wrong results. Proficiency testing of the laboratory and
the technician, which will reveal the rate of error for a given test, are there-
fore crucial for determining the test's validity. 1" 2
106. For a concise explanation of how statistics are used in scientific evidence, and describ-
ing statistics as "the science of uncertainty, a body of methods for making inferences and deci-
sions when faced with fallible observations or other forms of uncertainty," see Fienberg et al.,
supra note 92, at 3.
107. The mean, familiarly known as the average, is calculated by dividing the sample sum by
the sample size. For an excellent analysis of statistical concepts intended for a legal audience,
see generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 88-89
(1990) (analyzing use of hair evidence in bank robbery case).
108. Standard deviation is a calculation of the amount of variation among samples. The
standard deviation is calculated by taking the square root of the variance among samples. T.
COLTON, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 126 (1974). The standard deviation increases as the differ-
ences in results of individual sample points become larger. Id.
109. The level of statistical significance describes how plausible the values are. Acceptable
ranges are 5% to less than 1%. Fienberg et al., supra note 92, at 22. In designing an experiment
to determine whether a chemical is toxic or causes cancer, for example, the researcher, in addi-
tion to proposing a hypothetical relationship between the chemical and disease, accounts for
errors by using a null hypothesis-that the chemical in question has no effect-and mathemati-
cally summarizes the results that differ in the control (untreated) and test group. If chance alone
could explain the results of the experiment less than 5% of the time (an arbitrarily chosen but
generally accepted figure) the results of the experiment are said to be statistically significant. Id.
110. The complement of the level of statistical significance, confidence interval is defined as
the range within which the average of a particular data point lies 95% or 99% of the time. Id. at
24. It is the probability that the procedure produces an interval that includes the correct value.
Id. at 25. Scientific evidentiary standards are designed thus to minimize the occurrence of false
positives. For a discussion of the appropriateness of applying the 95% confidence interval to the
regulatory context and tort law, where the concern is not providing a firm foundation for future
research but identifying and controlling chemicals that more probably than not cause disease,
see generally RICHARD A. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCI-
ENCE AND LAW 40-48 (1993).
111. See Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process, 66 B.U.
L. REV. 439, 442 (1986) (noting the "dramatic growth" in legal cases involving statistical
evidence).
112. Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at
Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 24 (1993) [hereinafter Koehler, Error and Exaggeration]. Although
proficiency testing is designed to measure laboratory performance problems rather than error
rates, the frequency of false results, which is revealed through proficiency testing, is precisely
what the court needs to know, even if it is a by-product of the testing process rather than its goal.
See Jonathan J. Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even When a
National Research Council Report Says They Should Not), 37 JURIMETRICS J. 425, 429-30 (1997)
[hereinafter Koehler, DNA Likelihood Ratios] (explaining irrelevancy of the fact that profi-
ciency tests do not measure error rates).
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As a check on the judge's reasoning process, the Court also permitted
resort to peer review and publication, and general acceptance as surrogates
for the old Frye consensus test. These last two factors as noted above, may
have little to do with the soundness of the science behind proposed testi-
mony. Although studies that have been panned in the scientific press may
indeed have flaws that a judge ought to be able to take into account, there
may be many reasons for sound scientific studies to go unreviewed and un-
published; the intensely competitive nature of the scientific enterprise among
them.
Thus, in elaborating its factors, the Supreme Court took into account
many of the same factors-and all of the crucial ones-that scientists them-
selves use to assess each others' work. There is no glaring flaw with the
guidelines themselves, which are explicitly not to be used as a checklist, but
as a flexible framework for analysis. As the courts become more familiar
with applying this framework, they should become more comfortable with
assessing scientific validity of the evidence in their courtrooms. The ques-
tion, of course, remains open as to whether judges are capable of learning to
think like scientists.
2. Can Judges Learn to Think Like Scientists?
Many judges question judicial abilities to assess scientific validity. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, for example, in his Daubert dissent, felt the majority was
requiring district judges to become "amateur scientists. '1 13 Judge Kozinski,
in the Daubert remand, was openly sarcastic about the feasibility of the ef-
fort.1 1 4 There are, however, many judges who have risen amply to the occa-
sion. 115 A fair number of judges were engaging in a validity analysis long
before Daubert required it. 116 These judges demonstrate that judges can in-
deed learn to think like scientists, at least insofar as being able to recognize
faulty logic when they hear it.
In the four years since Daubert, the results admittedly have been une-
ven. Judges comfortable with analyzing scientific validity before Daubert
continue to do so. 117 Those judges too discomforted by the new analysis,
113. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
114. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
189 (1995).
115. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 763-65 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker,
J. holding Dr. DiGregorio's medical testimony inadmissible because he failed to examine pa-
tients and thus lacked necessary foundation to testify and using Daubert to hold Dr. Sherman's
testimony admissible for limited purpose).
116. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Weinstein, J.) (granting chemical companies' motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs
failed to present valid expert testimony showing causal link between exposure to Agent Orange
and veterans' diseases), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (Winter, J.).
117. For example, Judge Becker of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals employed a validity
test for admitting scientific evidence in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985)
(cited by the Supreme Court in Daubert), as well as in In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 763-65.
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however, are finding ways to circumvent it. Some of the avoidance tech-
niques include the erection of barriers by insisting the evidence meet require-
ments that have little to do with its inherent logic. For example, in the
Daubert remand, Judge Kozinski added an unwarranted new admissibility
factor that he found to trump those listed by the Supreme Court: whether the
research was conducted independent of the litigation.118 Even Judge Kozin-
ski recognized the problematic nature of his new factor for criminal evi-
dence,119 where most of the research involved is generated only for
litigation.120 There is virtually no other "market" for identification tests.
Heavy emphasis on the general acceptance factor without engaging in a
thorough analysis of the other factors, a kind of back-door endorsement of
Frye, also permits courts to evade accountability. 12 1 Another popular cir-
cumventing gambit for avoiding the in-depth scrutiny required by Daubert is
taking judicial notice of previously admissible testimony without new analy-
sis.1 2 2 This sort of "grandfathering in" of evidence that otherwise might not
meet the Daubert standards was a tactic taken by the Eighth Circuit when it
took judicial notice of the general validity of DNA identification techniques
based on the findings of a Second Circuit case.123 In doing so, it managed to
evade grappling with validity issues, and merely rubber-stamped another
court's perhaps faulty analysis.
In the civil context, the Second Circuit's reinstatement of geological evi-
dence that the district court had rejected under Daubert provides a novel
twist.124 The Second Circuit explained that such evidence was not scientific
See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 498-524 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (analyzing the use of
statistics in sentencing a drug courier); In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1244-45.
118. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317. This new factor was unwarranted because it had nothing to
do with any logical analysis of the proffered evidence. See Conley & Peterson, supra note 85, at
1197 (arguing that nothing in text of Daubert justified approach Ninth Circuit took).
119. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.5.
120. See also H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (exempting criminal evidence from the
proposed Daubert codification).
121. See, e.g., Officer v. Teledyne Republic/Sprague, 870 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D. Mass. 1994)
("Daubert's principles... have less use in fields like design engineering where 'general accept-
ance' is the norm, not the exception.").
122. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding validity
of DNA testing can be judicially noticed); Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1557-58
(E.D. Okla. 1995) (holding expert hair testimony invalid for failing to reach valid level of cer-
tainty); Hein v. Merck & Co., 868 F. Supp. 230, 235 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (taking judicial notice of
invalidity of hedonic damages); United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding polygraph evidence unreliable). The Daubert court recognized this as a viable option
for those branches of science that were well established. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993). Whether or not DNA profiling is such a well-established branch, the
danger, of course, is that one or two jurisdictions will determine the admissibility of a given
category of evidence and others simply will ride their coattails, turning the old general accept-
ance test on its head by making it acceptance by other courts rather than other scientists.
123. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1197 (concluding that taking judicial notice of the validity determi-
nation regarding DNA "fingerprinting" in a pre-Daubert case, United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d
786 (2d Cir. 1992), is still valid after Daubert).
124. Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994).
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at all and therefore not subject to Daubert analysis. It was merely "method-
ology and data typically used and accepted in construction-litigation
cases."' 12 5 This sounds suspiciously like a return to the old general accept-
ance standard, with a twist: the court seems to be relying on acceptance by
the courts rather than other experts.126 This permits the court to avoid the
required independent inquiry, with unfortunate results for accountability. 127
As discussed above, some jurisdictions do an end-run around the logical
analysis requirements of Daubert by categorizing certain types of expert evi-
dence as nonscientific. 12 8 Although the ostensible difference between Frye
and Daubert is that it is now explicitly the judge who acts as gatekeeper,
rather than the scientific community, 129 it is unclear whether the practical
125. Id. So much for Judge Kozinski's idea that research designed expressly for litigation
should be excluded! See supra notes 114, 118-20 and accompanying text.
126. Notably, this circumventing gambit is not limited to avoidance of the Daubert analysis.
Courts under the Frye rule used it too. The admissibility of bite mark evidence is instructive in
this regard. The earliest bite mark cases perfunctorily admitted the evidence without any discus-
sion of general acceptance. See People v. Johnson, 289 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972);
Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954). Even courts acknowledging that
bite mark evidence could not meet the general acceptance test found the evidence admissible as
verifiable by the court and based on "scientifically and professionally established techniques."
People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Ct. App. 1975). Later courts, rather than address the
dilemma, simply took judicial notice of previous courts' determinations of admissibility. People
v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1359 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (citing Doyle, Patterson and Marx). After
the murder conviction in Milone was affirmed, the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for habeas
relief based on the unreliability of the bite mark evidence used to convict him, because it found
the probative value of the state's evidence was not so greatly outweighed by its prejudice to the
defendant that its admission denied him a fundamentally fair trial. Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693,
702 (7th Cir. 1994); see also State v. Richards, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (Ariz. App. 1990) (admitting
bite mark evidence without any preliminary determination of reliability); People v. Middleton,
429 N.E.2d 100, 104 (N.Y. 1981) (relying on judicial notice of bite mark admissibility and dis-
claiming necessity of separately establishing scientific reliability in each case). In this way, bite
mark evidence found its way into widespread use in criminal prosecutions without ever having to
demonstrate any empirical basis for its underlying tenet that teeth can make recognizable marks
that are uniquely identifiable to a particular individual. See Steven Weigler, Bite Mark Evidence:
Forensic Odontology and the Law, 2 HEALTH Matrix 303, 306 (1992) (stating that teeth can
make recognizable marks usable in identifications). In the only case requiring forensic odontol-
ogists to demonstrate the empirical basis for their assertions, the experts were unable to identify
which of sixteen models of teeth had created the bite marks in question because all the models
could be made to match the contours of the marks. Kris Sperry & Homer R. Campbell, Jr.,
D.D.S., An Elliptical Incised Wound of the Breast Misinterpreted as a Bite Injury, 35 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 1226, 1231 (1990).
127. The Tenth Circuit, for example, took judicial notice of the "stringent Martinez stan-
dard" of the Eighth Circuit for DNA evidence-a standard which itself relied on judicial notice
of a Second Circuit case-without attempting any assessment of possible errors in execution,
although Martinez required such an assessment. United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1074-75
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1806 (1995).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging
that "lack of empirical evidence in the field of handwriting analysis" precluded admissibility
under Daubert, but nonetheless admitting it as specialized knowledge helpful to jury).
129. See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 555-56 (6th Cir. 1993) (explaining that judge
must now decide not only whether others in expert's field find reasoning sound, but also whether
reasoning really is sound within framework of scientific method).
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consequence of this difference will mean that cases will be decided differently
using the Daubert analysis than they were under Frye. Some skeptics con-
tend that Frye and Daubert essentially are indeterminate and cannot account
for the results in particular cases. 130
None of this means that judges are incapable of performing the required
analysis. What it does suggest, however, is a continued need for appellate
supervision and increased judicial education. The clear trend is toward more
informed judicial rulings, despite some backsliding. 131 Moreover, the neces-
sity of articulating the basis for evidentiary decision making on scientific is-
sues at least forces judges to focus more explicitly on whether the proffered
evidence will be helpful. 132 Requiring judges to examine the underlying ra-
tionale for proffered evidence, its accuracy, and connecting it with the mat-
ters under investigation does not seem to be asking more of common law
judges than what they are supposed to be doing: pursuing factual accuracy
through rational deliberation. 133 To do justice in a technological world,
judges-and lawyers educating them about their cases- must learn to grap-
ple with the scientific method.
C. Does Daubert Let More or Less Evidence In?
Many commentators predicted that the Daubert decision would result in
the diminished admissibility of scientific evidence, and proclaimed it a stricter
standard than Frye v. United States,134 which the Court explicitly over-
ruled. 135 Other commentators noted the anomaly that the testimony at issue
in Daubert was clearly outside the scientific mainstream, which should widen
the kinds of evidence courts would admit.136 Although Daubert's effect on
130. See, e.g., Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 10, at 1493-1509 (observing that
"the doctrine purportedly relied on by the courts in evaluating novel scientific evidence is of
little use in explaining and predicting the results in particular cases" and noting that "[sleveral
functional criteria, defensible to varying degrees on normative grounds, underlie the obscuring
layer of doctrine and offer greater explanatory and predictive power").
131. Bert Black, Winning the Expert Wars in the Age of Daubert, SB16 ALI-ABA 13, 15
(1996).
132. Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1157, 1169 (1994) (stating that changes wrought by Daubert are positive in "reduc[ing] the hiding
places for judges, and ... forc[ing] them to focus somewhat more explicitly on whether proffered
testimony will be helpful, which is to the good").
133. Faigman, supra note 29, at 429 (arguing that because "the decision about whether a
variable produced (or produces) an effect having a legal consequence is, fundamentally, a policy
decision, judges must make it.. requir[ing] judges to become sophisticated consumers of science
so that they can impose independent judgment on the research").
134. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For a survey indicating that two-
thirds of post-Daubert products liability cases citing Daubert excluded expert testimony, see
Jonathon Hoffman, A Briefcase and an Opinion: Post-Daubert Expert Testimony-A Major
Shift, 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 379 (Apr. 8, 1994).
135. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
136. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2013 (1996) (observing that "[a]s one might reasonably expect from a
more liberal admissibility requirement, post-Daubert courts are admitting more scientific evi-
dence in civil and criminal cases"). For an example of the dilemma, see, e.g., McKnight ex rel
19981
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admissibility-whether more or less evidence will be found admissible under
the new ruling-is a frequent topic of debate, it is a red herring.
Rather than a question of more or less evidence being admitted under
the Daubert gatekeeping standards, 137 it is instead a question of requiring
purportedly scientific evidence to justify itself on scientific grounds.138 The
Court in Daubert attempted to bring the legal and the scientific standards to
evaluate scientific evidence closer together without permitting the judiciary
to cede authority for what are essentially judicial policy decisions to non-
judicial actors.139
D. How Does the Daubert Question Arise?
Challenges to scientific validity of expert testimony ordinarily should be
addressed prior to trial, in a preliminary hearing pursuant to Rule 104.140
They may, however, arise in a number of other circumstances. They may be
raised in a motion in limine at trial. 14 ' Daubert itself arose in the context of
the defendants' summary judgment motion.142 Occasionally, defendants who
Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396 (8th Cir. 1994), where plaintiff argued that
Daubert makes expert testimony more readily admissible, while defendant argued that Daubert
makes expert testimony less readily admissible. Id. at 1406.
137. See United States v. Scholl, 959 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (D. Ariz. 1997) (noting that the
"debate over whether the new test would be more liberal (i.e., allow more expert testimony) or
would be more conservative (i.e., allow less expert testimony).. .cannot be answered simply...
rather] Daubert has become synonymous with the 'validity' test").
138. The impact and import of Daubert has been hotly debated by academics and practi-
tioners alike. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 134, at 379; Eric T. Berkman, Ruling on Expert
Evidence Hasn't Opened Floodgates, MAss. L. WKLY., Jan. 6, 1997, at 1 (noting that while
Daubert may broaden the field of what kinds of challenges are available, it also makes more
kinds of things admissible); Marcia Coyle, Cert. Granted For Expert Witness Case, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 31, 1997, at B1 (quoting evidence professor David I. Faigman as stating that "[ilnitial reac-
tion to Daubert was that it might be a more liberal rule, and so more testimony would come
in .... The reality is a lot of district courts have used Daubert to exclude, particularly when
evidence comes from less traditional areas of science").
139. See Allen, supra note 132, at 1163 (noting that deference model of judicial decision
making about expert opinion endorsed by the Frye standard is "at odds with the essence of the
common law mode of trial-the pursuit of factual accuracy through rational deliberation").
140. Hose v. Chicago N.W. Trans. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that
because defendant brought no pretrial challenge to proffered polsomnogram evidence relating to
sleep disorders, district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony and re-
jecting last minute challenge); Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 934 F. Supp. 1068, 1079-
80 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (declining to reject plaintiffs' expert evidence where defendants failed to
make objections under Daubert either before the trial or during direct examination; however,
because defense motions to set aside the verdict were based on insufficiency of evidence, court
heard the motion).
141. See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (stating
that although motions in limine should be filed well before trial, they are "permissible at any
point").
142. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989). In Daubert,
the parents of children born with defects reducing the size of their limbs brought suit against the
manufacturer of the morning sickness remedy Bendectin the mothers had taken during their
pregnancies. Id. at 571. When presented with defendants' epidemiologic evidence that Bendec-
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have failed to challenge scientific evidence at trial attempt to raise the issue
on appeal. The appellate courts have examined the trial courts' determina-
tions for "plain error" cursorily, but without a full Daubert hearing and gen-
erally without giving the defendants relief.143 If the issue is raised
subsequent to trial, the question will be whether the testimony met the re-
quirements of Rule 702 at the time of the lower court's admissibility rul-
ing.144 In any event, unless the evidence is specifically challenged, the court
may not exercise its gatekeeping authority. 145 Of course, in the criminal con-
text, failure to challenge expert testimony may itself, under extreme circum-
stances, be subject to challenge as ineffective assistance of counsel. 146
Daubert does not apply at sentencing hearings. 147 It is important to bear
in mind that although Daubert may be raised in a habeas petition,148 it raises
an evidentiary question, not a constitutional one. Thus, whether the evidence
violates a given specific constitutional guarantee is a question of probativity
versus unfair prejudice rather than satisfaction of the Daubert standard.149
Nonetheless, if the probativity is so minuscule because of the test's scientific
invalidity that it tips the scale toward unfair prejudice, that should be suffi-
cient to reopen the question. Further, the failure of the court to provide
resources for defense experts may be a violation of due process. 150
A troubling trend in at least one jurisdiction is the holding of simultane-
ous Daubert hearings and deposition of experts. 151 It is difficult to fathom
how a rigorous inquiry into the scientific validity of the proposed testimony
would be possible in such circumstances. In criminal trials, with their less
tin does not cause birth defects, plaintiffs countered with reanalyses of defendants' evidence. Id.
at 573. The court found this evidence inadmissible and granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 573-75.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (limiting review to
plain error amalysis of fingerprint testimony because no challenge at trial); Hose, 70 F.3d at 973
n.3 (maintaining challenges to scientific reliability ordinarily should be addressed prior to trial).
144. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 1993).
145. McKnight ex rel Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1407 (8th Cir. 1994).
146. See Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1520 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding failure to inves-
tigate defendant's mental illness or seek competency hearing was ineffective assistance of
counsel).
147. United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 380 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating Daubert "has no
application at sentencing[;]" evidence must only have "sufficient indicia of reliability to support
its probable accuracy").
148. Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1994).
149. Id. at 701.
150. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (recognizing a due process right to expert assist-
ance for indigent defendants); Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1562 (E.D. Okla.
1995) ("When forensic evidence and expert testimony are critical parts of the criminal prosecu-
tion of an indigent, due process requires the state to provide an expert who is not beholden to
the prosecution.").
151. See, e.g., Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. v. Johns Manville Corp., 151 F.R.D. 540,
544 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (ordering joint hearings and depositions to eliminate duplicative discovery
and harassment of experts).
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extensive discovery rights and fewer resources, this trend may pose an even
more significant handicap to the defense. 152
E. Did Daubert Improve Consistency in the Courts?
At least one reading of the Supreme Court's opinion is that its emphasis
on the judge's gatekeeping role was an effort to achieve consistency-at a
high level of rationality-in the way courts handle scientific evidence. 153 The
growing use of scientific evidence and its importance in criminal prosecu-
tions154 makes a perceived lack of consistency a real concern for the fairness
of the justice system.155 Although consistency without rationality obviously
will not solve the problem of fairness, 15 6 inconsistent results implicate the
rationality behind at least some of the decisions. 157 There is good basis for
concern: if the object of the justice system is a search for truth-even ac-
knowledging that truth is socially constructed-courts should be reluctant to
allow juries in different jurisdictions to decide common issues of logic differ-
ently. 158 The evidentiary merits of a particular branch of science-that in-
quiry contemplated by the "methodology and reasoning" categories of the
Daubert standard-need to be examined and articulated as the subject of
judicial policymaking that is the prototypical province of the judge.
Because the Frye general acceptance test was adopted by the vast major-
ity of jurisdictions, uniformity of standards was not a problem the Supreme
152. See Berger, supra note 14, at 53 (stating that "the accused may be more handicapped
in challenging expert scientific proof offered against him or her than the civil litigant because of
less extensive discovery rights and fewer resources").
153. See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 10, at 1498 (stating that "given the
essentially 'objective' nature of the scientific enterprise, courts should be reluctant to allow juries
in different jurisdictions to decide common issues differently").
154. See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudica-
tion of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987) (citing a study that showed that
about one-fourth of jurors interviewed after having served on trials involving scientific evidence
and resulting in convictions believed that had such evidence been absent they would have
changed their verdicts from guilty to not guilty).
155. Faigman, supra note 29, at 412 (noting that "given the essentially 'objective' nature of
the scientific enterprise, courts should be reluctant to allow juries in different jurisdictions to
decide common issues differently").
156. Thus, courts that circumvent considered analysis by taking judicial notice of prior ad-
missibility decisions may be increasing consistency at the price of decreasing rationality. As the
Court observed, "the Rules [of Evidence]-especially Rule 702-do assign to the trial judge the
task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to
the task at hand." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). That is not
to say that a court must ignore widespread acceptance of particular principles and methodolo-
gies; it is one of the factors a court ought to take into consideration. Id. at 594. But it is no
longer the only factor. Courts must now examine the error rate, existence, and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation, and peer review and publication. Id. at 593-94.
157. For a law and economics argument that judicial consistency is not desirable, and that
the lack of consistency under Daubert is a good thing because a dispersion of admissibility out-
comes indicates that interest groups have less to gain (and less influence over judicial decisions)
under Daubert, see Parker, supra note 79, at 49.
158. Faigman, supra note 29, at 411.
1998] BLINDED BY SCIENCE
Court sought to correct, even though uniformity of result varied widely.
Thus, evidence that was perfectly acceptable in one jurisdiction often was
inadmissible in another, although both applied the same general acceptance
standard. The admissibility of voiceprint evidence (sound spectrography),
for example, varied widely under the general acceptance standard. Psychiat-
ric testimony concerning future dangerousness, still admissible in Texas1 59
(and upheld by the Supreme Court in the face of acknowledged disapproval
by the scientific community 160 ), was excluded under Frye in the District of
Columbia. 16
1
The Supreme Court effected a complete upheaval in the uniformity of
standards. Now, rather than a single widely applied standard, a myriad of
approaches flourish. Most obviously, Daubert is a federal standard, involving
construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, leaving state courts nominally
free to follow the old general acceptance test. Although most states have
adopted rules of evidence modeled on the federal rules, they need not con-
strue the rules the same way the Supreme Court does. 162 Thus, the standards
of analysis may vary according to jurisdiction, causing widespread variations
in the admissibility of particular types of evidence. Arkansas, for example,
rejects Daubert, although it uses a similar reliability/relevance approach. 163
New York, California, Connecticut, and Florida have rejected Daubert in
favor of the Frye standard.164 Texas, on the other hand, has adopted the
Daubert standard. 16 5
159. TEX. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(2)(1) (West Supp. 1993). Although Texas has not aban-
doned its use of psychiatric testimony about future dangerousness, its continued admissibility is
explained because this kind of testimony simply has not been subjected to Daubert analysis. See
Rogers v. Director, TDCJ-ID, 864 F. Supp. 584, 591 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
160. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897-99 (1983) (maintaining that although psychiatric
predictions of future dangerousness were wrong two out of three times, such testimony was not
so unreliable it should be ignored).
161. In re Wilson, 33 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2115 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1983) (involving
civil commitment proceedings).
162. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1182-83 (Ariz. 1993) (emphasizing that state
courts-even those that have adopted Federal Rules of Evidence-are not bound by Daubert,
which interprets only federal law and not the Constitution).
163. Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 292 (Ark. 1996) (adopting the relevancy approach of
Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991)). Although Arkansas has adopted a detailed
approach to analyzing the admissibility question, it does not necessarily adhere to a rigorous
analysis in all cases, however. See id. For example, in Peebles v. State, 808 S.W.2d 331 (Ark.
1991), the supreme court found admissible a physician's testimony identifying film on victim's
body as semen by using an ultraviolet lamp although the physician had not previously been
qualified to testify as an expert, had never before used the ultraviolet lamp, and conceded that
the lamp would illuminate substances other than semen. Id. at 334; see also Isbeil v. State, 931
S.W.2d 74, 78 (Ark. 1996) (admitting gunshot residue testimony despite concessions that the test
had been administered without controls, test was incomplete and its result jeopardized, finding
such factors would go to weight rather than admissibility).
164. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1994); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn.
1997); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454
(N.Y. 1994). As of 1995, twenty-two states were continuing to apply the Frye rule. Joseph R.
Meany, From Frye to Daubert: Is a Pattern Unfolding?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 191, 193-94 (1995).
165. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995).
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Moreover, even among federal courts, which must apply the Daubert
standard,166 considerable disagreement exists over what kinds of expert testi-
mony must be subjected to a Daubert analysis. In the great categorization
debate over whether evidence-especially in criminal trials-should be clas-
sified as science or "technical nonscience," the Second,167 Fourth,168 and
Ninth 169 Circuits explicitly have limited Daubert analysis to scientific evi-
dence, exempting evidence they consider "technical" from rigorous analysis.
An example of this kind of differential analysis can be seen in the Tenth
Circuit's Muldrow'7 ° opinion. There the court implicitly limited Daubert to
scientific knowledge and excluded technical expertise. 171 It subjected to
Daubert analysis a chemist's testimony identifying the subject collected in a
drug bust as cocaine while omitting such analysis with respect to a veteran
police officer's expert testimony that the amount recovered in the bust was
consistent with distribution rather than personal use.172 This differential ap-
plication of standards creates an obvious disparity in results.
There are numerous splits among the circuits about what types of evi-
dence are subject to Daubert. First, there is a split over whether Daubert's
principles apply to all types of expert evidence. Second, there is disagree-
ment over whether technical expert evidence should be exempted from
Daubert analysis. Third, among those circuits that assume Daubert does not
apply to technical evidence, the circuits disagree about whether a particular
type of evidence falls into the category "technical" rather than "scientific."
No clear definition of what is "technical" has emerged, although, in general,
courts seem to be using it as a catch-all category for criminal identification
evidence that is needed for the prosecution, but that cannot withstand scien-
tific scrutiny. An excellent example of this circular reasoning can be found in
the Second Circuit's Starzecpyze1173 decision, where the court held that no
Daubert hearing was necessary for technical, specialized knowledge such as
handwriting analysis, acknowledged the testimony could not meet the
Daubert standards, and then admitted it anyway as technical knowledge. 174
Daubert is thus a problematic resolution to disparate application of admissi-
bility standards.
166. Some courts manage to circumvent even this fairly uncontroversial mandate. See, e.g.,
Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995) (declining "to 'shackle the district court with a
mandatory and explicit' reliability analysis").
167. See, e.g., Jacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994)
(limiting Daubert analysis to novel scientific evidence in order to find geological testimony ad-
missible without applying the Daubert standard).
168. Thornton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 575, 578-79 (refusing to apply Daubert anal-
ysis to mechanical engineering testimony).
169. See, e.g., Thomas v. Newton Int'l Ent., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
abuse of discretion in exclusion of expert testimony regarding dangerousness of unguarded ves-
sel hatch cover because Daubert applied only to evaluation of scientific expert testimony).
170. United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1994).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
174. Id. at 1028-29.
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Another complication inhibiting uniformity is the disagreement among
the circuits over whether the expert's failure to follow valid protocol goes to
weight or admissibility. 175 Failure to follow the protocol for a given method-
ology obviously increases the error rate. Although the general error rate for
the properly followed protocol might be acceptable scientifically, failure to
follow the protocol may increase drastically the error rate in a particular case,
making the evidence unreliable.1 76 The question then becomes whether the
expert's failure to follow protocol is egregious enough to make the evidence
unreliable.1 77
For example, although the Eighth Circuit has taken judicial notice of
both restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP)178 and polymerase
chain reaction (PCR)179 DNA identification techniques, it has acknowledged
that failure to adhere to standard protocol may cause the evidence to fail
under Daubert's second prong.' 80 The Tenth Circuit agreed that "[i]f the
offering party does not follow protocol, the scientific evidence may not be
relevant under Daubert's second prong because improperly applied science
cannot assist the trier of fact."'1 81 Thus, in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, at
least, challenges to DNA admissibility still may be brought based on per-
formance of the technique.' 82 The problem with this approach, however, is
that if experts are required to submit affidavits attesting only that the proto-
cols were performed properly-as they were in Martinez 183 -eaving it to the
opponent to ascertain enough from the affidavits to challenge the particulars,
it may be impossible to mount a defense.' 84 Placing the burden of demon-
strating the inadequacies of government laboratory techniques on already
175. See United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 & nn.6-7 (10th Cir. 1994) (declining
to address split in circuits over whether compliance with protocol goes to weight or admissibility,
but noting that "[i]f the offering party does not follow protocol, the scientific evidence may not
be relevant under Daubert's second prong because improperly applied science cannot assist the
trier of fact").
176. Notably, the Supreme Court included error rate as one of its factors for the validity
analysis thus presumably intending courts to use this factor in their admissibility determinations,
rather than relegating the question to the jury as a question of weight. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
177. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that even where
court takes judicial notice of general theory such as DNA profiling, it must make initial inquiry
into particular expert's application of methodology and exclude testimony if errors so infected
the procedure as to make it unreliable). As the Eighth Circuit articulated the issue, "error in the
application of a reliable methodology should provide the basis for exclusion of the opinion only
if that error negates the basis for the reliability of the principle itself." Id. at 1198.
178. Id. at 1197.
179. United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996).
180. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1197-98.
181. United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1074 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Martinez, 3
F.3d at 1197; United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 912 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.N.M. 1996).
182. Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1197.
183. Id. at 1198.
184. The Martinez case itself reveals fallacy of this approach. There, although the defend-
ant claimed that the government failed to provide adequate discovery, the court gave short shrift
to this argument because it was not raised below. Id. at 1199.
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underfunded criminal defendants may place an insurmountable obstacle in
the quest for truth.' 85
In sum, Daubert has created quite a maelstrom. It has left issues un-
resolved and the courts in disagreement over the proper answers. In time
these issues will be hammered out, for better or for worse. 186 The courts'
discourse with each other and society over what counts as evidence inevitably
will become more focused. One thing that Daubert cannot be, however, is
ignored. It is creating changes in the way courts respond to expert scientific
testimony. It is also causing changes in the kinds of evidence that are admit-
ted and in the way evidence is justified, collected, analyzed, and presented.
185. See Giannelli, supra note 20, at 117-28 (giving numerous instances of the obstacles
indigent defendants face in obtaining experts and vital discovery in criminal trials); cf. Koehler,
Error and Exaggeration, supra note 112, at 21 (giving numerous instances of unchallenged ex-
pert testimony).
186. For example, the Supreme Court, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512
(1997), settled debate among the circuits over the proper standard of review. Daubert is silent
on what standard an appellate court should apply to a trial court validity determination. In
Joiner, the Supreme Court reiterated that the traditional abuse of discretion standard should be
applied. Id. at 515. Although most jurisdictions that had addressed the issue applied the abuse
of discretion standard to the Daubert analysis, at least one court applied a heightened abuse
standard, in which the trial court's decision was revisited, though some deference was paid to its
determination. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 763-65 (3d Cir. 1994). Some
courts added a further refinement: a two step standard of review in which the reviewing court
first undertook de novo review to determine whether the trial court had properly followed the
Daubert framework. If so, the appellate court will review only for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit advocated a three-part stan-
dard of review in which the expert's qualifications were reviewed under a clear error standard,
the helpfulness of the testimony under an abuse of discretion standard, and scientific validity
under de novo review. See Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1995) (declin-
ing to follow de novo standard, while acknowledging its "intuitive appeal" with respect to scien-
tific evidence). The Eleventh Circuit, according to the Supreme Court in Joiner, applied an
overly stringent standard of review when it overturned the district court's finding that Joiner's
experts had failed to show that his exposure to PCB "promoted" his lung cancer. Joiner, 118 S.
Ct. at 516. The Eleventh Circuit had reasoned that the Federal Rules of Evidence display a
preference for admissibility, and thus applied a stringent standard of review. Id. The Supreme
Court explained that, although Daubert allows the district courts to admit a "somewhat broader
range" of evidence than under Frye, a court of appeals "may not categorically distinguish be-
tween rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow it." Id. at 517. The Joiner
opinion is not particularly suprising, upholding as it does the standard of review. Conceptually,
however, there does not seem to be any sound basis for assuming the appellate court is any less
competent in reviewing scientific evidence de novo than the trial judge. The traditional reason
for deferring to the trial judge on evidentiary rulings is that the trial judge has the benefit of
reviewing the demeanor of the witness to determine whether the witness is lying. Because it is
not the witness's credibility at stake in scientific evidence, but the validity of the underlying
methodology and application, it is not necessary to give the trial judge's observation any particu-
lar weight. Moreover, the jurisprudential policy issues transcending the facts of a given case are
more appropriately resolved by appellate courts.
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III. MAJOR AREAS OF CHANGE: POST-DA UBERT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Judges who give undue deference to scientific experts by evading
Daubert analysis, either through categorizing such evidence as technical (and
therefore nonscientific) or by judicial notice without analysis, are abdicating
their responsibilities and perpetrating injustice, especially in criminal trials.
For example, experts appear for the defense in only a small percent of crimi-
nal cases.187 Less extensive discovery rights and fewer resources add to de-
fendants' handicap.188 In a survey of death penalty attorneys, more than half
felt that the court provided insufficient funds for investigation of the facts
and expert witnesses.' 89 The result is a weighting of the evidence in the pros-
ecution's favor.
Permitting experts to testify beyond the bounds of their expertise-a fre-
quent occurrence in criminal trials-only makes matters worse. 9° Examples
abound of forensic pathologists who have been allowed to testify about how
guns work and the caliber of deformed bullets, a field obviously outside their
area of expertise. 19' There probably have been an equal number of ballistics
experts permitted to testify about the character of wounds, an equally repre-
hensible practice.' 92
These factors add an additional layer of unfairness to the lack of rigor-
ous empirical testing from which so many widely-used identification tech-
niques suffer.' 93 As noted above, although now discredited, voiceprint
187. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 137-140 (1966) (stat-
ing that in only 6% percent of all criminal trials is a defense expert used); Berger, supra note 10,
at 1359 (citing studies that show courts rarely grant requests for expert witnesses). Although a
defendant has due process rights to an expert under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the
defense must still prove need, a factor that often presents significant difficulty. Id. at 76; see
Sonja L. DeWitt, Note, The Indigent Criminal Defendant, DNA Evidence and the Right to an
Expert Witness: A Comparison of the Requirements of Due Process in State v. Dubose and Harris
v. State, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 267, 274 (1996) (discussing how Ake rationale, finding due process
right to psychiatrist at trial, applies equally to DNA cases); cf. James E. Starrs, Recent Develop-
ments in Federal and State Rules Pertaining to Medical and Scientific Expert Testimony, 34 Duo.
L. REv. 813, 815 (1996) (noting that it is rare for experts to testify for defense in criminal cases
involving persons of little means).
188. See Berger, supra note 14, at 53 (observing that "the accused may be more handi-
capped in challenging expert scientific proof proffered against him or her than the civil litigant
because of less extensive discovery rights and fewer resources").
189. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L
L.J. 30, 40 (June 11, 1990).
190. See Koehler, Error and Exaggeration, supra note 112, at 21 (1993) (citing numerous
instances of unchallenged expert testimony beyond their expertise).
191. Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595, 664
(1988).
192. See R.J. Joling & W.W. Stem, An Overview of Firearms Identification for Attorneys
III: Qualifying and Using the Firearms Examiner as a Witness, 26 J. FORENSIC SCI. 166, 170
(1981) (noting problem).
193. See Berger, supra note 11, at 1354-55 (observing that some of most venerable branches
of forensic science-such as fingerprinting, ballistics, and handwriting analysis-have never
demonstrated ability to make unique identifications).
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analysis was once a widely used identification method that was never empiri-
cally tested.194 Yet, in approximately eighty percent of the cases in which
such evidence was admitted, no opposing expert testified for the defense. 195
A further example of the courts' undue deference to scientific experts is
their failure to demand that forensic and toxicology laboratories submit their
findings and procedures to rigorous independent testing.' 96 Independent
testing is necessary because even where there is some empirical justification
for a given methodology, its use in a forensic laboratory may be problematic.
Errors such as sample-switching and contamination invalidate results. DNA
"fingerprinting," for example, is enormously controversial, not because of
any challenge to the scientific basis for detecting genetic differences between
individuals, but because of the absence of proficiency testing in the laborato-
ries employing the technique. 197
The controversial nature of the statistical estimates involved provides a
further basis for challenging DNA typing. One example is the exaggeration
of evidentiary significance by the sheer magnitude of the odds given for DNA
matches.198 Scientific evidence in criminal trials nearly always involves a
194. See Bert Black, Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scien-
tific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715, 739 & n.159 (1994) (stating that "the assumption that no
two persons produce the same sound spectrogram had never been verified; nor had anyone ever
tested whether a person can intentionally change his voice to alter his spectrogram or to produce
the same spectrogram as someone else").
195. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFI-
CATION 49 (1979). The extensive scrutiny given DNA evidence illuminates the utter lack of
empirical basis for most purportedly scientific identification tests. See generally Saks & Koehler,
supra note 10, at 361 (the extensive scrutiny given DNA evidence reveals that there is a lack of
empirical support for most forensic evidence and noting that the widely asserted assumptions
that no two fingerprints, gun barrel markings, writings, or tool marks is the same lacks empirical
support).
196. Moenssens, supra note 13, at 16-17. Although sloppy technique and faulty instrumen-
tation probably is a more significant source of error than blatant falsification, in either event, the
result is an intolerable miscarriage of justice.
197. Appropriate scientific standards are widely ignored in forensic laboratories, according
to Andre A. Moenssens, who notes that "[e]xperts and crime laboratories did not fare well in
proficiency testing conducted by their own professional organization." Id. at 10. See generally
William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons
from the "DNA War", 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993); see also James P. O'Brien, Jr.,
Note, DNA Fingerprinting: The Virginia Approach, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 781 (1994)
(identifying the "major hurdle that DNA fingerprinting must overcome: DNA typing is capable,
in principle, of an extremely low inherent rate of false-positive results, so the risk of error will
come from poor laboratory practice or sample handling and labeling, and because DNA typing is
technical, a jury requires the assurance of laboratory competence in test results") (quotations
and internal citations omitted). Proper testing procedures are critical to the accuracy of forensic
evidence. The NRC, for example, issued a report on DNA testing recommending stricter stan-
dards for certifying and testing forensic laboratories. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (Apr. 14, 1992) [hereinafter DNA TECHNOLOGY].
198. One case cited odds as one in 340 billion, more people than have ever lived on earth.
See People v. Lindsey, 868 P.2d 1085 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). The NRC of the National Academy
of Sciences issued a report in 1993, finding DNA typing generally reliable (depending on the
particular method employed) but calling for use of a "ceiling" principle in statistical analyses
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proffered probability statement, yet few judges have attempted to understand
the statistical basis of these statements and their underlying assumptions.199
Statistical errors routinely are committed even by defense attorneys, sug-
gesting that lawyers as well as judges could benefit from increased training in
probability theory.200
A. Taking Daubert Seriously
Circumventing the Daubert mandate to examine the underlying validity
of proposed expert testimony is all the more shocking because performing
the Daubert analysis is not difficult. There are judges who apply Daubert
routinely and well and whose rigorous standards should serve as a model to
those overwhelmed by their gatekeeping responsibilities.
where the highest frequency for any population sub-group would be used if there were any
differences between population groups. DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 198, at 51-54, 81-83.
For a discussion of the ceiling principle, see Scheck, supra note 25, at 1970-75. For an example of
what a difference the statistical assumptions can make, see United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540
(6th Cir. 1993) (ignoring the ceiling principle and the NRC Report that would have given odds of
1 in 17 that the DNA in question could have been someone other than the defendant's, the jury
was given odds of 1 in 35,000), affg United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991). See
Scheck, supra note 25, at 1992. Statistical errors are by no means the only ones implicated in
DNA testing. For example, testifying forensic scientists are often reluctant to admit the possibil-
ity (and implications) of false positive tests, although technical errors such as, in the case of
DNA testing, enzyme failures, abnormal salt concentrations, and dirt specs and human error, can
all produce misleading DNA banding patterns, which may cause false positive testing. Koehler,
Error and Exaggeration, supra note 112, at 23 & nn.4-9. Other frequent statistical mistakes of
experts in testifying about DNA identification evidence include use of a non-case specific refer-
ence population based on the ethnic group of the suspect (which may result in errors for in-
stance, if the suspect population could include the suspect's relatives, making the probability of a
match increase dramatically). Id. at 28 & n.24. Poorly estimating the number of people who
would need to be tested (the sample size) before finding a DNA match may exaggerate the
probative strength of this evidence. Id. at 34 & nn.49-51. The NRC recognized the controversial
nature of probability estimates an expert may make when DNA tests indicate a "match" due to
factors that may seriously underestimate coincidental matches, such as the frequency with which
particular gene components are found within a given population and whether these particular
components are independently inherited and proposed using a ceiling principle so that the as-
signed probability of a match will always be greater than the true probability. DNA TECHNOL-
OGY, supra note 198, at 13-14, 82-85.
199. A forensic expert offering hair evidence may, for example, opine that the possibility of
a hair found at the scene of the crime coming from someone other than the accused in one
chance in several thousand. See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1979)
(noting expert testified that three out of five hairs found in ski mask worn during robbery were
microscopically similar to one or more of nine mutually dissimilar hairs taken from the defend-
ant and that there was only one chance in 4500 that hairs in ski mask could have come from
someone other than defendant). It is important to be alert to possible statistical fallacies under-
lying these assertions. See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 107, at 88-89 (discussing the Mas-
sey case and expressing doubt that any hair could be similar to more than one of nine mutually
dissimilar hairs).
200. See David H. Kaye, Thinking Like a Statistician: The Report of the American Statistical
Association Committee on Training in Statistics in Selected Professions, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97
(1984) (observing that statistical argument is not taught by 76% law schools answering survey-
consisting of 90% of all ABA-approved law schools).
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Judge Edward R. Becker's opinion in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB
Litigation20 1 offers a model outline for analysis. There, in remanding plain-
tiffs' chemical exposure injury claims, Judge Becker addressed the need for a
judge to examine every step in an expert's reasoning.20 2 In addition to as-
sessing the investigative process used by an expert, a judge also must make
an independent assessment of the reliability of an expert's data.20 3 More-
over, Judge Becker noted that methodology and its application were fre-
quently intertwined.2 0 4 He further noted that assessing the importance of
any particular factor requires comparison with possible alternative causes.20 5
A district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania used this kind of
a framework in United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chemicals, Inc.,20 6 an
environmental action. The court denied the defendant beverage manufac-
turer's motion to strike an expert witness who was prepared to testify that the
manufacturer's process for removing labels from returnable bottles yielded
hazardous waste products. 20 7 The expert was a chemical engineer, who, in-
stead of independently testing the waste materials, relied upon the defend-
ant's own answers to interrogatories, deposition testimony of waste haulers,
and exhibits for his conclusions. 20 8 The beverage manufacturer objected to
his qualifications to render an opinion about the hazardous content of its
waste, contending that an analytical or physical chemist was required. 20 9 The
court disagreed, finding that the expert did not need any particular degree as
long as he had the combined knowledge, skill, experience, training, and edu-
cation necessary to make an evaluation of the data generated by the manu-
facturer in its defense.210 Nor did the expert need to test the waste
personally in order to testify about the nature of the waste bottle-washing
normally produces.2 11 Interpreting the data generated by the manufacturer
to reach a contrary conclusion was permissible, although the conflicting con-
clusions of the experts might raise a difficult issue of fact.2 12
The judges in the Third Circuit are not the only ones able to apply
Daubert well. In the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Williamson v. Reyn-
olds2 13 involved an assessment of hair analysis claims by the government and
exemplifies a court's understanding of scientific issues. The government
presented an expert who testified that, of the hundreds of hairs found at the
201. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
202. Id. at 742.
203. Under this part of the analysis, the judge is making a Rule 703 analysis, using the same
standards as those used in Rule 702's reliability determination. Id. at 747.
204. Id. at 743.
205. Id.
206. No. CIV.A.91-5118, 1993 WL 485561 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1993).
207. Id. at *4.
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. at *1.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at *4.
213. 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
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murder scene and submitted to the laboratory for analysis, two scalp hairs
and two pubic hairs were "consistent microscopically" with the defend-
ant's.2 14 But because the expert failed to explain which of the twenty-five
characteristics he examined were consistent, due to the absence of standards
for determining whether the samples were consistent, and because the expert
could not explain how many other people might be expected to share the
same combination of characteristics, the court disallowed the testimony.2 15
The court noted that although hair analysis "has become a familiar and com-
mon component of criminal prosecutions," it has been criticized as being too
subjective and having a high error rate.2 16 Judge Seay explained that in-
dependent studies showed that the method used by the expert in this case
was especially subject to erroneous conclusions, because the expert knew
which hair samples came from the crime scene and which came from the
crime suspect.2 17 In checking its conclusion that the proffered hair analysis
was unscientific, the court found no general acceptance, because the only
consensus about such evidence was among hair experts, "who are generally
technicians testifying for the prosecution, not scientists who can objectively
evaluate such evidence. '218 Thus, although the expert may have followed
procedures accepted by other hair experts, the results were scientifically un-
reliable, despite a long history of admissibility.219
Applying a Daubert framework of analysis to the social psychology of
coerced confessions, Judge McDade, in United States v. Hall,2 20 examined the
expert's qualifications.2 2 1 At issue was whether the defense expert could tes-
tify about factors that frequently correlated with false confessions.2 22 The
reason the defense wished to introduce this testimony was to counter the
widely-held assumption that only guilty people confess. 2 2 3 The problem the
court faced was that the first of the Daubert criteria, testability, seems keyed
to a paradigm of experimental laboratory science rather than the so-called
"soft" (or social) sciences. 224 The science of social psychology in general,
and the specialty of coerced confessions in particular, however, rely on data
214. Id. at 1554.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1555. The court noted further that in a study conducted by the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (in response to criticism of the high error rate in forensic analy-
sis) the error rates on hair analysis were "as high as 67% on individual samples, and the majority
of the police laboratories were incorrect on 4 out of 5 hair samples analyzed." Id. at 1556.
217. Id. at 1557.
218. Id. at 1558.
219. Id.
220. 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
221. The expert had a doctorate in social psychology and a thirty-five year academic career,
written and published extensively. Id. at 1203.
222. Id. at 1204.
223. Id. at 1206.
224. Karl Popper, whom the Supreme Court cited in its testability section, explicitly devel-
oped this standard to distinguish what he considered the "real" or "hard" sciences from the
economics of Karl Marx and the psychology of Sigmund Freud. See supra notes 97-98 and ac-
companying text.
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generated through systematic observation rather than controlled experimen-
tation. Although the court was tempted to bypass Daubert by categorizing
the expertise involved as "technical," it nonetheless analyzed the proferred
evidence under what it termed a "Daubert framework. 225
Not surprisingly, 226 the court had no difficulty qualifying the expert in
the field of coerced confessions. 227 What was more difficult for the court
was assessing whether the methodology comported with the scientific
method. Field testing rather than laboratory testing is the norm for the field
of social psychology. The court found that although the expert and other
social psychologists used observational as opposed to experimental tech-
niques, social psychology was nevertheless a sufficiently reliable body of spe-
cialized knowledge to be admissible under Rule 702.228 Effectively, the court
recognized that there is more than one scientific method.2 29 Yet, that does
not mean that there are no standards in the social sciences or that they are
inaccessible to critique.
In making its determination, the Hall court examined the development
of the field of social psychology and its subspecialty of coerced confes-
sions.230 The court noted that hundreds of studies had been performed and
carefully examined the nature of the studies and the analysis of data gener-
ated by the studies.231
The court explained that the study method involved examination of the
post-confession narrative statements of known false confessions (docu-
mented cases where people had confessed to crimes that were later proved to
have been committed by someone else) together with scrutiny of the interro-
gation techniques used (as determined through audio- or videotapes or by
subsequently interviewing the parties about the details of the interrogation)
to determine which documented factors correlated with the elicitation of
false confessions. 232 Statistical analysis was used to find which of these fac-
tors predominated in false confessions. Additional studies used statistical
techniques to correlate the accuseds' personality traits and intelligence with
the false confessions. 233
225. Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1202.
226. The qualification test is rather easily met, so it is not surprising that a well-published
academic in the field of coerced confessions should meet the qualifications of an expert in co-
erced confessions.
227. Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1204.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, FACTS AND FACTIONS IN NATURAL SCIENCE IN
QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE: PROOF, PRACTICE AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 478,
489 (James Chandler et al. eds., 1994) ("The demands for rigor of experimental design in theo-
retical inference vary widely in science from field to field, sometimes between very closely allied
domains of research.").
230. Hall, 974 F. Supp. at 1203.
231. Id. at 1204.
232. Id. at 1203.
233. Id. at 1204.
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From this method, social psychologists were able to conclude that the
major distinguishing factor for false confessions is the interrogator's contin-
ued use of coercion either through false accusations or false promises of leni-
ency. Interrogators apparently believe that a guilty person will be more
likely to crack under such tactics than would an innocent person. 234 The
studies performed by social scientists, however, demonstrate that certain per-
sonality and intelligence traits of the accused, when combined with coercive
interrogation tactics by the interrogator, result in false confessions.23 5
The Hall court properly limited the defense expert's testimony to the
correlation between false confessions and various interrogation techniques
and personality factors. The court noted that some of those techniques were
used in the defendant's case.236 The expert could not testify beyond these
bounds, i.e., about the defendant's psychological makeup (as the expert was
not a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), about causation-whether the in-
terrogation techniques used caused the defendant to confess falsely-or com-
ment about the details of the post-confession statement (because that was the
province of the jury).2 37 Thus, the court, although dealing with evidence that
did not precisely fit the Daubert paradigm for experimental laboratory sci-
ence, was capable of using the Daubert framework to examine the logic be-
hind the proposed testimony and to limit it appropriately in light of its
examination.
The use of new technology does not need to confound the court. Faced
with deciding if an arousal test commonly used to monitor and treat sex of-
fenders could be used as the basis for demonstrating that the defendant did
not possess the characteristics of a pedophile, neither the trial court nor the
court of appeals in United States v. Powers238 had any difficulty determining
that the methodology developed for treatment purposes could not be used
for litigation, because there were no accepted standards for its use as a diag-
nostic tool, and many incest offenders had a normal reaction to the test (so
that it had a high rate of error (in this case, false negatives).2 39
Another court, in United States v. Lowe, 240 facing even more impressive
technology, a new twist in DNA methodology, also admirably analyzed the
technique in light of Daubert, this time finding the new technology to be
admissible.24 1 At issue in Lowe was the use of chemiluminescence in place
of autoradiography in the detection phase of restriction fragment length pol-
ymorphism (RFLP) DNA analysis, in order to produce a clearer image.242
First, the court reviewed the RFLP methodology in general, as well as its
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1203.
236. Id. at 1206.
237. Id.
238. 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995).
239. Id. at 1471.
240. 954 F. Supp. 401 (D. Mass. 1996).
241. Id. at 421.
242. Id. at 408.
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application to the evidence in the case.24 3 The court noted that although
RFLP analysis was widely accepted as scientifically valid, the change in pro-
tocol to chemiluminescence technique required the court to review its testing,
error rate, peer review and general acceptance. 24 4
Two validation studies, which the court discussed in detail, showed that
the new techniques gave substantially similar, but crisper, detection results in
population frequencies as had the older autoradiography technique. 245 The
court heard detailed testimony with respect to the causes of any variations
between the methods, and was able to conclude that there was no significant
impact on the reliability of the RFLP testing methodology.2 46
Although error rate is an important factor in determining admissibility,
the FBI in Lowe had conducted no such studies.2 47 Neither laboratory error
rate nor blind proficiency tests were available.24 8 This might have posed a
problem had the defendant not had an opportunity to test the evidence him-
self.249 According to the court (citing a report of the National Resource
Council), the "wrongly accused person's best insurance against the possibility
of being falsely incriminated is the opportunity to have the testing re-
peated. ' '250 Split samples had been presented to the defendant for analysis,
and no contrary results were urged on the court.2 51
The above cases are merely a few of the many examples of courts adher-
ing to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court's mandate. What all
these courts have in common is their willingness to use a critical approach
when dealing with questions of scientific validity. In applying the Daubert
243. Id. at 403-11.
244. Id. at 411.
245. Id. at 412.
246. Id. at 412-13.
247. Id. at 414.
248. Id. at 414-15.
249. Id. at 416. Under a strict Daubert analysis, the absence of data showing the error rate
for the methodology should have given the court severe misgivings about admissibility. Without
knowing the test's accuracy, assessing its validity is a near impossibility. The problem for the
court, however, is that there is no regulation of forensic laboratories, no requirement for any
proficiency testing, and virtually no control for bias of the technician, since double-blind studies
are simply not done in crime laboratories. See William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Stan-
dards: The National Research Council's Second Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37
JURIMETRICS J. 405, 413-14 (1997). In the absence of such requirements, rather than bounce all
evidence handled in unregulated forensic laboratories-arguably, a preferable solution- courts
generally rely on the defendant's ability to retest the samples to correct abuses. However mis-
placed the Lowe court's optimism about retesting as a panacea may have been-and Professor
Thompson vigorously opposes the notion-the court was hardly alone in its optimism.
250. United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 410, 416 (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMrITEE ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE 3-11 (1996)).
251. Id. Professor Thompson outlines three reasons for doubting that defendant retesting is
a panacea for lack of laboratory controls: first, critical samples may be exhausted in testing mak-
ing retesting impossible; second, samples are frequently mishandled before splitting, so that re-
testing will not resolve the errors; third, retesting shifts-partially, at least-the burden of proof
to the defendant. Thompson, supra note 250, at 415-16.
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guidelines, these courts examine the explanatory power of the proffered evi-
dence, its logical consistency, its testability, the precision and objectivity of
the testing method, and its consistency with accepted theories. 252 To check
their own analysis, the courts then turn to peer review and general accept-
ance. The above examples demonstrate that trial courts can do the required
analysis routinely and well.
B. Categorical Admissibility Changes
In those courts that are taking Daubert seriously, there have been a
number of notable changes in the kinds of evidence that are being admitted
or excluded, demonstrating the potential for beneficial change that Daubert
presents. Notably, the problems inherent in traditional eyewitness testimony
have been explored in a number of jurisdictions and a number of courts have
stated expressly that under the right circumstances, eyewitness identification
expert testimony is admissible.253 Polygraph evidence, long considered in-
herently untrustworthy, has been re-examined in a number of jurisdictions,
often at the insistence of the defense. 254 Psychiatric and psychological testi-
mony is being reexamined as a sufficiently reliable body of genuine special-
ized knowledge in an appropriate case. 255 Daubert has been used to analyze
issues of child abuse 256 and post-traumatic stress disorder (including failure
to act and repressed memories).257 Daubert also has been used to exclude
previously admissible testimony lacking empirical basis such as voice identifi-
252. See Black, supra note 131, at 63 (suggesting these as guideposts for scientific validity).
253. United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting increased acceptance of
expert eyewitness identification testimony); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding that where eyewitness identification expert's opinion is based upon scientific
knowledge which is reliable and helpful to jury it should be admitted); United States v. Stevens,
935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing in part to admit eyewitness identification expert testi-
mony regarding correlation between confidence and accuracy); United States v. Norwood, 939 F.
Supp. 1132 (D.N.J. 1996) (permitting expert to testify on issues of cross-racial identification,
weapon-focus, stress, forgetting curve, relation-back phenomena, correlation between confi-
dence and accuracy, suggestiveness of pretrial identification procedures and effect of exposure
duration on eyewitness identification); United States v. Jordan, 924 F. Supp. 443, 447 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) (finding expert eyewitness testimony admissible), affd, 108 F.3d 330 (1997). But see
United States v. Almador-Galvan, No. 96-10137, 1997 WL 124342, *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997)
(upholding exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony because it lacked scientific support).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995) (remanding for
determination of scientific validity); United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 896 (D.N.M.
1995)(finding evidence admissible subject to limitations); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp.
1354, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1995) (same).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 109 F.3d 1227 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding district court
applied incorrect standard in excluding proffered expert testimony regarding defendant's suscep-
tibility to giving false confession).
256. Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (D. Neb. 1994) (exclud-
ing expert's testimony as unreliable); Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508-09 (D. Conn.
1993) (excluding testimony of hypnotically refreshed memory).
257. Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 290 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding repressed memory
testimony admissible); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(holding post-traumatic stress disorder and repressed memory testimony admissible).
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cation,258 mistaken identity testimony by forensic anthropologists, 25 9 and ex-
pert testimony regarding police discipline theory.260
1. Eyewitness Testimony
Expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identification is an im-
portant and recurring issue. 261 Most courts addressing the issue have de-
clined to admit such testimony, both before and after Daubert.262 The
reaction of the Eighth Circuit is fairly standard. When the proffered expert
testimony relates to the unreliability of adult eyewitness testimony, the
Eighth Circuit has found such testimony to be inadmissible, as failing both
the reliability and the helpfulness prongs of Rule 702.263 The Eighth Circuit
found itself unable to assess the scientific validity of the proposed expert's
testimony where all that had been submitted were the expert's affidavit and
two articles on "how to conduct a non-misleading pre-trial lineup" (in a case
where no pretrial lineup had been conducted) containing bare citations to
other articles without further explanation. 264 More broadly, however, the
court ruled that the "evaluation of eyewitness testimony is for the jury
alone. '265 The court's concern was that, rather than a general observation
about the problems inherent in eyewitness testimony, the expert was propos-
ing to testify about "'the inherently untrustworthy manner with which...
[the eyewitness] ... identified ... [the defendant] ... in court." 266 This, the
court held, was an unwarranted intrusion into the jury's domain.267
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's assumptions, however, substantial re-
search has shown that jurors overbelieve eyewitnesses and have difficulty dis-
tinguishing accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses, primarily because they
258. Virgin Islands v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1995). Voice spectrography offers a
prime example of the fallacies which can occur when courts permit a small community of foren-
sic specialists to self-validate the technology. See Kirsch, supra note 3, at 221. In 1979 a mul-
tidisciplinary team sponsored by the National Academy of Science reviewed the scientific basis
of spectrography and found it suspect, particularly when conditions departed from the labora-
tory situation. Id. at 218 n.45.
259. United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1995).
260. Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348-53 (6th Cir. 1994).
261. United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 1995) (declining to exclude expert
testimony on identification as matter of law, despite denying its admissibility in particular case
before it).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Almador-Galvan, No. 96-10137, 1997 WL 124342, at *2 (9th
Cir. Mar. 18, 1997) (upholding district court's conclusion that expert testimony on eyewitness is
identification inadmissible); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (same);
United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cit. 1979) (same). But see United States v. Ste-
vens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1401 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding, pre-Daubert, that it was not harmless error to
exclude expert testimony that confidence in eyewitness identification does not necessarily corre-
late with accuracy).
263. United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 884.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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miscorrelate witness confidence with accuracy.268 Studies of proven cases of
wrongful conviction indicate that eyewitness errors constitute the largest sin-
gle factor in wrongful convictions.2 69 Recently, twenty-eight convictions-in
each of which eyewitness identifications figured-were overturned based on
exculpatory DNA evidence.270
Cross-examination is overrated as a safeguard against erroneous eyewit-
ness identification. Although witness confidence may be shaken on cross-
examination, this does not improve the jury's ability to detect accuracy, and
sometimes makes it worse.2 71 Even more disturbing are the studies that
demonstrate that coaching (such as most witnesses receive from attorneys in
preparation for trial) increases the confidence of inaccurate witnesses far
more dramatically than it does for accurate witnesses.272 This obviously has
dire implications for the truth-finding mission of the jury.
Moreover, judicial instructions on the error potential in eyewitness iden-
tifications do not appear to have any great mitigating effect.273 Jury decision-
making does not seem to improve with judicial instructions regarding
conditions affecting eyewitness identification reliability. Despite increased
skepticism, mistaken identifications are still validated at the same rate.274
Educating juries that an eyewitness identification, like most beliefs, is suscep-
tible to social influences such as conformity, compliance, suggestion, commit-
ment, and motivation, is the province of an expert.275 Because judges,
lawyers, and lay jurors all predominantly suffer from the misconception that
witness confidence correlates with identification accuracy, 276 this may be an
area in which an expert actually can be helpful to the jury.
Eyewitness expert testimony typically focuses on how the process of
memory, perception, and retrieval of information work in general, and how
the specific circumstances surrounding an identification may have affected its
268. Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing
Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 817, 830 (1995).
269. Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice
System, 12 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 283, 291 (1988). In one study of 1000 cases, for example,
eyewitness errors constituted the largest single factor in wrongful convictions. Daniel Coleman,
Studies Point to Flaws in Lineups of Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1995, at CI; see also Jack B.
Weinstein, Book Review, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1991) (reviewing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYE-
WITNESS TESTIMONY (1979), which cites studies of wrongful convictions based on faulty eyewit-
ness testimony).
270. Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 439, 477 (1997).
271. Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 909, 923 (1995).
272. G. Wells et al., The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and its Implications for Triers
of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688, 693-94 (1981).
273. E. Greene, Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 252-76 (1988).
274. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 269, at 834.
275. Lieppe, supra note 272, at 929.
276. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 269, at 817-19.
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accuracy. 277 The Third Circuit admitted such eyewitness identification testi-
mony even before Daubert, finding that "under certain circumstances, expert
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications can assist the jury in
reaching a correct decision and therefore may meet the helpfulness require-
ment of Rule 702. ' '278 More recently, in United States v. Stevens,279 Judge
Becker, writing for the Third Circuit, held the district court had abused its
discretion in barring testimony on the confidence/accuracy factor of eyewit-
ness identification. 280 Gradually, some of the federal district courts are
catching on, finding testimony in the area of human memory and perception
to be based on scientific knowledge. 2 81
Some state courts also are using the Daubert analysis to find expert eye-
witness testimony reliable. In Jordan v. State,282 the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals remanded for application of a Daubert validity analysis a case in
which the primary disputed issue was the eyewitness identification of one of
the robbers.2 83 Responding to arguments that the expert's testimony would
not be helpful because the subject matter was within the common knowledge
of the jurors, the court said the testimony could be helpful by either validat-
ing or calling into question the jurors' inclinations.2 84 It also disagreed with
the lower court's finding that cross-examination of the eyewitness would pro-
vide the jury with the same information. 285
2. Psychology and Social Science Evidence
Psychological and sociological evidence, at least in some jurisdictions,
also is being subjected to Daubert analysis. The argument over applying
Daubert standards to such "soft" sciences centers around whether they
should be considered science at all. 2 8 6 Nonetheless, in United States v. Rouse,
277. Christopher M. Walters, Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1402, 1407 (1985).
278. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court in
Daubert quoted liberally from Judge Becker's Downing opinion, concerning the scientific valid-
ity assessment. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 594 (1993). On
remand, however, the trial court remained unpersuaded that the expert would be helpful to the
jury. Downing, 609 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985).
279. 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991).
280. Id. at 1400-01.
281. See United States v. Jordan, 924 F. Supp. 443, 447-49 (W.D. N.Y. 1996), affd, 108 F.3d
330 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (D.N.J. 1996) (relying
heavily on United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), as well as Daubert, in deter-
mining expert eyewitness testimony to be scientifically valid).
282. 928 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
283. Id. at 555.
284. Id. at 556.
285. Id. A Texas trial court reversed itself in light of United States v. Jordan, finding the
expert eyewitness testimony it had previously excluded to be sufficiently reliable to be admitted.
Nations v. State, 944 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
286. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 132, at 1172 (explaining that Karl Popper's notion of fal-
sifiability endorsed by Supreme Court was originally an argument to discredit psychiatric "sci-
ence" of Sigmund Freud and economic "science" of Karl Marx); Faigman, supra note 93, at 1039-
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the Eighth Circuit, acknowledging that application of Daubert to the social
sciences is problematic, held that the defendants had "fulfilled the require-
ments of Daubert.''287 It found that testimony concerning child witnesses
and their susceptibility to faulty memory should not have been barred when
its purpose was to show that the investigative means employed in the case
were consistent with the psychological studies that similar techniques oper-
ated suggestively on young children. 288 The district court had erred in sum-
marily rejecting the testimony as "not the sort even contemplated by
Daubert.-289 The appellate court reviewed the literature, the proposed testi-
mony and the interview practices at issue, and, reversing the district court's
exclusion of the evidence, found the testimony admissible.2 90 On rehearing,
however, the Eighth Circuit found the district court's exclusion of the evi-
dence to have been harmless error. 29
1
Nonetheless, an increasing number of jurisdictions are turning to the ad-
missibility criteria of Daubert for resolution of admissibility questions regard-
ing the social sciences and psychological evidence. Expert testimony on post-
traumatic stress disorder and repressed memory has been found admissible
under Daubert.292 For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court applied
Daubert criteria to admit testimony regarding the diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder in the victims of sexual abuse.2 93 There, the experts were per-
mitted to testify that a victim's symptoms were consistent with post-traumatic
stress disorder.2 94 Adding to the cacophony, other courts have applied the
Daubert criteria to the same sort of evidence and found that it did not meet
the standard for scientific validity. 295
51 (discussing fact that courts should be aware of limitations of social sciences with respect to
scientific method); Teresa S. Renaker, Comment, Evidentiary Legerdemain: Deciding When
Daubert Should Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1664-68 (1996) (argu-
ing that such testimony functions more as specialized knowledge and should be evaluated not as
science, but by assessing its helpfulness to jury).
287. United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560, 569 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated by reh'g en banc, 111
F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Rincon v. United States, 510 U.S. 801, 801 (1993) (remanding
for reconsideration in light of Daubert where expert testimony about eyewitness testimony was
at issue).
288. Rouse, 100 F.3d at 567-69. Of course, expert testimony concerning the suggestibility
child witnesses is not automatically admissible under Daubert. It still must meet the test of
relevance. See United States v. Reynolds, 77 F.3d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1996) (excluding expert
testimony because child witness had not been interviewed and therefore was not subjected to
faulty techniques).
289. Rouse, 100 F.3d at 569.
290. Id. at 573.
291. Rouse, 111 F.3d at 561.
292. Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1057-67 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
293. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 202-03 (N.M. 1993).
294. Id. at 210.
295. See Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342, 1353 (D. Neb. 1994)
(holding, in civil case, that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate reliability of experts' psychological
methodologies); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 701-02 (N.H. 1993) (reversing conviction where
psychologist had testified that victims' symptoms were consistent with those of sexually abused
children because such vague symptomology was not scientifically valid).
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3. Polygraph Evidence
Under Daubert, at least under certain conditions, longstanding per se
rules excluding polygraph evidence appear to be loosening.2 96 Although the
Supreme Court's post-Daubert decision in United States v. Scheffer2 97 upheld
the constitutionality of a per se rule against the admission of polygraph evi-
dence in court-martial proceedings, it did so on the basis of the current unre-
liability of such tests, leaving open the possibility of differing conclusions
among the individual district courts.298 The Fifth Circuit has rejected its ear-
lier denial position,2 99 and district courts in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have admitted polygraph evidence proffered by the defense as exculpatory
evidence. 30 0 Polygraph testing, intended to measure and record physiological
responses to stress (supposedly induced by fear of deception), has been re-
fined considerably since its origins at the beginning of this century.30 1 For
example, in United States v. Posado,30 2 the Fifth Circuit noted advances in
instrumentation and technique, and-while excluding the proffered poly-
graph evidence in the case before it- found such evidence would not be per
se inadmissible under Daubert.303
Nonetheless, polygraph accuracy remains debatable, and at least ten per-
cent of the population is simply untestable. 3° 4 Courts have differed widely in
determining the admissibility of such tests. Polygraph examination results
were found admissible under Daubert in a criminal tax evasion action in the
District of New Mexico 30 5 and in a robbery trial in the District of Arizona. 30 6
In the robbery trial, the court limited the testimony to preclude admission of
specific questions and responses, permitting testimony only to the fact that
the defendant took and passed the polygraph test and to the validity of the
examination. 30 7 The Sixth Circuit 30 8 and the Southern District of New
296. Frye itself was a polygraph case, in which the District of Columbia Circuit Court held
polygraph evidence inadmissible because the theory and techniques had not met with general
acceptance in the scientific community. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Although the predominant result before Daubert was exclusion, a few courts found polygraph
evidence to be admissible. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972);
United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
297. No. 96-1133, 1998 WL 141151 (Mar. 31, 1998).
298. Id. at *5.
299. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding polygraph evi-
dence no longer would be per se inadmissible for any purpose).
300. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 895 (D.N.M. 1995) (admitting results
of polygraph test in defense of willful income tax evasion); United States v. Crumby, 895 F.
Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D. Ariz. 1995) (allowing use of polygraph evidence in defense of bank
robbery charge).
301. Kesan, supra note 136, at 2014.
302. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
303. Id. at 434.
304. Experts believe that at least 10% of the population can fool even a properly adminis-
tered test. Kesan, supra note 136, at 2015.
305. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 895.
306. See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D. Ariz. 1995).
307. Id. at 1363-64.
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York 30 9 bypassed Rule 702 analysis entirely and instead opted to exclude
polygraph evidence under Rule 403 as misleading and confusing to the jury.
4. Other Forensic Identification Evidence: A Mixed Bag
In other areas, the results have been mixed and the courts are in fre-
quent disagreement over the same kinds of evidence. There are certainly
instances in which Daubert has kept out shaky evidence. For example,
Daubert analysis has been used to exclude testimony based on the use of the
penile plethysmograph, which purportedly measures sexual response to vis-
ual stimulation.3 10 Voice identification also has failed the scientifically valid
prong of Daubert.3 11
On the other hand, a number of highly questionable techniques continue
to find widespread currency in criminal cases. Some courts are letting in evi-
dence which they concede cannot meet the Daubert standard, by categorizing
it as "technical" rather than "scientific. ' 312 Handwriting analysis, for exam-
ple, failed to meet the Daubert test in the Southern District of New York,
although the reviewing court nonetheless admitted it as technical exper-
tise. 313 The Sixth Circuit similarly decided that even though handwriting
analysis could not meet the test for scientific knowledge, its exclusion was
not required. The court cited a case from the District of Columbia Circuit for
the proposition that handwriting expertise "'can be judicially noted"' be-
cause such evidence "'like fingerprints, are subject to established objective
tests."' 314 A third court found handwriting admissible under Daubert as long
as it was applied evenhandedly to both the government and defense
experts. 315
Hair identification, which generally long has been admissible in criminal
prosecutions, 3 16 continues to be admissible, despite numerous studies show-
308. See Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 662 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that prejudicial
effect of of polygraph results outweighed probative value under Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
309. See United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that poly-
graph answers likely would mislead or confuse jury).
310. See United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1471 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming district
court's exclusion of penile plethysmograph evidence).
311. See Virgin Islands v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's
exclusion of voice spectography evidence); see also Kirsch, supra note 3, at 221-22 (1995) (stating
that courts often innapropriately rely on the founders or initial proponents of technology in
question); see supra note 259.
312. See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "technical" versus
"scientific" debate.
313. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
that although handwriting analysis could not meet the Daubert standards, it was still admissible
because Daubert does not apply to technical evidence).
314. United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1159 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Greenberg Gallery,
Inc. v. Bauman, 817 F. Supp. 167, 172 n.5 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
315. See United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 848-50 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying same Rule
702 standards to government and defense expert witnesses on handwriting).
316. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against the Underem-
ployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 41, 62 (1982) (observing that the
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ing the inadequacy of the currently available techniques. 3 17 The subjectivity
and statistical unbelievability of the number of asserted comparisons appear
to be the principal problems with the methodology. 318 Indeed, even the pro-
genitor of hair analysis techniques, B.D. Gaudette, has expressed doubts
about its objectivity. 319
Bullet identification evidence also has survived Daubert in spite of its
questionable scientific basis. For example, in United States v. Davis,320 such
evidence was admitted despite the expert's concession that he had no way of
knowing how many other bullets produced in the same factory on the same
day as those he tested and identified as being from the same box in defend-
ant's possession had the same elemental composition. 321 The Eighth Circuit
upheld the expert's identification procedure as scientifically valid anyway,
finding all four of the Daubert factors to be present: general acceptance,
testability, publication, and peer review. 322 Contrary to this finding, bullet
identification techniques have been widely scorned as subjective determina-
tions lacking in scientific basis.323
Another post-Daubert court successfully circumvented any logical analy-
sis of expert photogrammetry evidence that purported to be able to estimate
the height of an individual in a bank robbery photograph by comparing it to
the dimensions of other known objects in the photograph.324 The court sim-
"massive body of case law, liberally admitting even hair evidence of low probative value, dwarfs
the handful of cases excluding hair evidence").
317. See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analy-
sis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 COLuM. Hum. RTs. L. REV.
227, 227 (1996) (noting that limited empirical studies concerning human hair comparisons reveal
more questions than answers).
318. FiNKELsmmiN & LEVIN, supra note 107, at 481 (criticizing sharply hair comparison
techniques).
319. B. D. Gaudette, Some Further Thoughts on Probabilities and Human Hair Compari-
sons, 23 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 758, 759 (1978) (noting that hair comparison is somewhat subjective).
Firearms identification is a similar example of an essentially subjective technique, which, though
based on apparently objective criteria such as striation marks on a bullet, depends on the subjec-
tive judgment of the technician, making the individual technician's error rate an important issue
in the testimony's validity. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Twenty-First Annual Kenneth T. Hodson
Lecture: Scientific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 137 MIL. L. REV. 167, 184 (1992) (noting
that the greater a forensic technique's subjectivity, the greater the possibility of error).
320. 103 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 1996).
321. Id. at 674 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Saks & Koehler, supra note 10, at 368 n.28 (explain-
ing that identification ability of firearms evidence, as well as that of most forensic sciences, has
never been demonstrated).
322. Davis, 105 F.3d at 673-74. The problem here, however, may have been an inadequate
challenge, because the defense merely read a single critical paragraph from a book. Id. at 674.
Perhaps if defense counsel had an expert who could have explained the significance of this factor
in a scientific validity determination, it might have fared better.
323. See, e.g., ANDRE A. MOENSSENS & FRED E. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES 458 (2d ed. 1978) (explaining that neutron activation bullet analysis is fundamentally
suspect because it is subject to human contamination); Giannelli, supra note 317, at 183 (noting
that although based on objective data such as striation markings, bullet identification techniques
ultimately rest on subjective judgment of examiner).
324. United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1994).
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ply affirmed admission of it as technical expertise, similar to computer-as-
sisted calculations. 325 In a more rational decision, the Fourth Circuit,
presented with the same kind of evidence, excluded the forensic anthropolo-
gist's testimony because the methodology was not tested, had not been sub-
ject to peer review, was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community, and had a high rate of error.3
26
There does not appear to be any general consensus among the courts on
these oft-used tools for criminal prosecutions. Those courts which take
Daubert seriously frequently find themselves unable to admit evidence based
on prevalent forensic techniques. Frightened by such a prospect, other courts
attempt to evade the issue by categorizing evidence as "technical" and there-
fore not required to meet the standards for scientific knowledge. Such eva-
sion of their judicial responsibilities undermines the judicial system.
C. Increased Scrutiny of Forensic Practice and Procedure
Despite the significant role forensic evidence plays in criminal trials,
there is no mandatory regulation of forensic laboratories. 327 The laborato-
ries of the Federal Bureau of Investigation-through which passes the foren-
sic evidence for some of our major national cases-are not even
accredited.32 8 Shocking but true: "clinical laboratories must meet higher
standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet
to put a defendant on death row." 329 Forensic laboratories are subject to no
mandatory external review process.330 As a result, questionable evidence re-
sulting from slipshod practices and substandard procedures has been
presented by the prosecution in hundreds of cases, all too frequently with
consequent convictions. 331 For example, when the Forensic Science Founda-
325. Id. at 1465.
326. United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 814-15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1168
(1995).
327. Giannelli, supra note 271, at 474.
328. In 1994, FBI Laboratory Director Louis Freeh announced that the laboratory would
pursue accreditation by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/ Laboratory Ac-
creditation Board "at the earliest possible time." FBI LABS REPORT, supra note 18, at 22. To
date, the lab has not received its accreditation.
329. Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (June 15, 1989).
Clinical laboratories have been federally regulated since Congress passed the Clinical Labora-
tory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (1988) (amending
42 U.S.C. § 263a).
330. Giannelli, supra note 271, at 473. The National Academy of Science has recognized
the problem in its report on DNA testing, acknowledging that "[p]roficiency testing and audits
are key assessment mechanisms in any program for critical self-evaluation of laboratory per-
formance." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE
78 (1996).
331. See In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab, Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 511-17 (W.Va. 1993) (noting systemic deficiencies in state crime lab including failure to
require written protocol, failure to follow generally recognized testing standards, absence of
quality control or proficiency testing); Marcia Coyle, Expert Under Fire in Capital Cases, NAT'L
L.J., July 11, 1994, at Al (reporting on bogus testimony of forensic dentist testifying about tool
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tion sent samples of hair, blood, bullets, and paint chips to over two hundred
police laboratories in the United States and Canada, 71% misidentified the
blood sample, 50% failed to identify the hair sample as dog hairs, 34% failed
to match paint chips, and 88 laboratories tried to match .22 caliber bullets
from two different weapons. 332 A pre-Daubert survey conducted under the
auspices of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences identified compe-
tency as the most significant ethical problem in the field, together with the
failure of forensic scientists to express the strengths and weaknesses of their
data, giving opinions exceeding the limits of their data and failure to remain
objective in evaluating evidence and giving testimony.333 The recent investi-
gation into the FBI forensic laboratories reveals significant instances of sub-
standard work,334 inadequate laboratory training and deficient knowledge,33 5
tailoring testimony in favor of the prosecution,33 6 and failures to present ob-
jective reports.337
These problems remain of great concern today.338 The Department of
Justice has investigated the FBI laboratories and found them wanting.339 It
directed major changes to take place, including the development of written
protocols, increased training, improved standards, quality control, and in-
creased supervision of expert testimony.340 The Report further recognized
that "for the ... Laboratory to have wide-ranging credibility in courts and in
the forensic community, examiners must strictly adhere to established proto-
cols for the analysis of evidence or document the reasons for departing from
marks, shoeprints, fingernail comparisons, knife-wound comparisons in which he used un-
founded and unreproducible lighting technique to make identifications); Hansen, supra note 76,
at 64-65 (debunking the work of forensic anthropologist Louise Robbins, who claimed ability to
identify person who made particular footprint by examining any other shoes belonging to that
individual-a scientifically unexplained feat no one else could reproduce). See generally Gian-
nelli, supra note 271, at 441 (detailing abuses in use of scientific evidence, including perjury by
expert witnesses, faked laboratory reports, and testimony based on unproven techniques).
332. Moenssens, supra note 27, at 561 (concluding that appalling number of laboratories
reported erroneous results); see also Michael J. Saks, Accuracy v. Advocacy: Expert Testimony
Before the Bench, 90 TECH. REV. 42, 47 (Aug.-Sept. 1987) (referencing the National Institute of
Justice's study showing varying levels of lab competency).
333. Giannelli, supra note 318, at 178 & n.57 (citing Joseph L. Peterson & John E. Mur-
dock, Forensic Sciences Ethics: Developing an Integrated System of Support and Enforcement, 34
J. FORENSIC Sci. 749, 751 (1989)); see also Michael J. Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical
Problems in Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC Sci. 772, 775-78 (1989) (discussing proficiency test-
ing and concluding that "errors are indeed made and that there is a wide range of in-
terlaboratory variation").
334. FBI LABS REPORT, supra note 18, at 2.
335. Id. at 13.
336. Id. at 10 (detailing the testimony given by the FBI expert in the World Trade Center
bombing case, United States v. Salameh, No. S5-93, 1993 WL 364486 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1993), in
which the explosives expert gave opinions based on invalid inference, an incomplete statement,
and invalid and misleading statements about the types of explosives, so that his opinion was
mere speculation based on evidence linking the defendants to that explosive).
337. Id. at 14.
338. Id. at 1.
339. Id. at 1 (Executive Summary).
340. Id.
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them. The same is true for the handling of evidence and the adoption of
measures to prevent and detect contamination."'34 ' These pervasive problems
with forensic evidence have been acknowledged, at least with respect to
DNA evidence, in the passage of the 1994 DNA Identification Act,3 4 2 which
requires that laboratories receiving federal funding submit to proficiency
testing. Thus scientific validity requires proficiency testing and the mainte-
nance of high laboratory standards, a factor recognized by the Supreme
Court when it included the error rate as a reliability guideline under
Daubert.343
CONCLUSION
In Daubert, the Supreme Court explicitly directed the trial judge to con-
sider error rate and proficiency testing when considering the admissibility of
scientific evidence. 344 The inability of identification technique evidence to
meet these tests should preclude its admissibility. Moreover, until such pur-
portedly scientific evidence can justify itself on scientific grounds, it ought to
be excluded. Indeed, by insisting that evidence used in criminal trials have a
scientifically valid basis before it may be admitted, courts can play a major
role in advancing the quality and reliability of the fact-finding process. In
this regard, Daubert presents a great opportunity to improve the quality of
criminal jurisprudence. Courts that continue to admit forensic evidence that
cannot justify itself on scientific grounds under the rubric of "technical" evi-
dence, or by taking judicial notice of its long admissibility history are not only
misreading Daubert, but are impeding much-needed reforms in forensic
laboratories.
Nevertheless, Daubert has caused a profound change in the rhetoric of
judicial analysis and has focused the law on the necessity of a test for the
admissibility of scientific evidence that considers the evidence itself and not
merely the conclusions of a witness. Courts must now at least go through the
motions of examining the scientific validity of proffered evidence. Obviously,
some courts are more adept at the required analysis than others,345 and some
courts are notably recalcitrant in performing it at all. Nonetheless, the level
of the debate has changed. No longer is it enough to obtain the approval of a
cohort of the expert's cronies willing to vouch for the technique. At the very
least, Daubert has focused attention on the importance of examining the un-
derlying theory and technique rather than just the proffered conclusion.
341. Id. at 24-25 (concluding that the "process of managing necessary changes will be chal-
lenging in an environment in which scientific knowledge is expanding and forensic science is
increasingly under scrutiny").
342. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
343. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (stating the "court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error... and the existence and mainte-
nance of standards controlling the technique's operation") (citations omitted).
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 763-65 (3d Cir. 1994) (utilizing
a thorough Daubert analysis in the civil context).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it explicit that examining the logical
basis of expert reasoning is what judges should be doing when they make the
admissibility decision, rather than merely polling professional opinion.
Some critics contend that Daubert has changed little about the way
courts handle scientific evidence other than changing the label. 346 Certainly,
far too many criminal courts are evading their Daubert duties. However,
such criticism fails to take into account the changes criminal laboratories are
already beginning to undertake as a result of the increased scrutiny of labora-
tory protocols and techniques. 347 In addition, the scientific validity of previ-
ously accepted identification techniques is now being challenged with some
success.348 Absent the heightened scrutiny required under Daubert, it is
doubtful such changes would be feasible.
346. See, e.g., Thomas J. Mack, Scientific Testimony After Daubert: Some Early Returns
From Lower Courts, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 23-24 (noting that courts have had little difficulty
shifting the analysis from general acceptance to scientific validity with no change in results).
347. The shakeup in the laboratories of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, for example,
although the result of a whistleblower's allegations rather than court proceedings, has caused the
reopening of many criminal cases and the renewed focus on laboratory procedures and practices.
See generally Ruth Larson, Serious Deficiencies Plague FBI Crime Labs, Errors Affect Bomb-
ings, Other Cases, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at Al (detailing results of probe concerning FBI
laboratory procedures and practices).
348. See Bernstein, supra note 14, at 137-38 (observing that post-Daubert courts are more
inclined to give closer scrutiny to expert scientific testimony).
